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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis examines the effects of European immigration policies on crime and 
society, with a focus on the past and present security challenges of shifts of peoples and 
demographics since 1942 and 1989, which have changed the face of Europe. The first 
chapter reviews the significance of the issue in the context of the historical and economic 
developments in which post-war immigration has assumed its familiar dimensions. The 
second section discusses the effects of immigrant-related crime on the security and 
prosperity of Germany and the failures of the German policies and German government 
to integrate the immigrants fully into German society. The third chapter analyzes 
immigrant-related economic crime and its effects on German economic prosperity. 
Section IV addresses the effects of German immigration policies on violent crime against 
immigrants in Germany, as it engenders feeling of attack among immigrants facing what 
appears to be resurgent German chauvinism. The final chapter offers a summary of 
German governmental and multilateral actions that address immigrant-related crime and 
recommendations for future coordination of immigration policies to enhance security in 
Europe through cooperation of governments and European security institutions.  This 
thesis concludes coordinated cooperative measures can provide the lasting framework for 
the integration of immigrants. 
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 This thesis examines the complex effects of European immigration policies on 
crime and society, with a particular focus on the past and present security challenges of 
post-World War II and especially post-cold war shifts of peoples and demographics, 
which have literally and figuratively changed the face of Europe.  Amid the real and 
perceived pressures of integrating generations of increasingly different-seeming 
immigrants (commonly referred to as "them" by "us," the native born ethnic majority), 
the meaning of citizenship in the European Union (EU) has assumed central importance 
in official and popular quarters since the end of the cold war, with the reconstruction and 
legal integration of Europe on the one hand, and, on the other, the rise of ethnic and 
nationalist turmoil in Europe’s south and east.  Now, more than ever, immigrant-related 
crime dominates the discourse of European domestic and transnational security.  Various 
(and variously successful) European responses to the “immigration problem” show how 
history and the cherished ideals of national self-identification affect and directly limit 
policy options and political rhetoric. 
This thesis investigates the changing nature of European citizenship due to 
immigration and its connection to security in Europe through the enhanced coordination 
of immigration policies within the EU. The objective of this thesis is to highlight 
diplomatic and policy techniques that European governments and other decision-makers 
can use to promote a more secure environment while protecting national and economic 
interests, maintaining the open and diverse community that underlies post-war European 
prosperity and accommodating the triumphs and burdens of the national past.  
The historical and contemporary experiences of Germany combine all of these 
elements; as such, this thesis focuses on Germany, the economic center of the continent 
of Europe with particular connections to eastern and southern Europe and a lively public 
debate on national identity and immigration.  This thesis seeks to answer how  
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immigration policies in Germany affect crime by and against immigrants, and how these 
polices can best be used to improve German, European, and perhaps global security.  To 
this end, this paper asks: 
• How has immigration affected crime and security in Germany? 
• How does German history affect perceptions of immigration and crime in 
Germany?  
• What is the role of the media in popular and policymaking discussions? 
• How can the EU and other international institutions assist Germany in integrating 
the new residents into their new nation to diminish the crime rate? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE 
 The questions of policy analyzed in this thesis have applications well beyond 
Germany today. The findings and prescriptions for improved security have implications 
for the national defense and homeland security of the United States, granted the 
interconnection of matters of citizenship and security in Europe and their effect on the 
United States. Additionally, the imperfect match, as a model, of past and current 
immigration to the United States, colors perceptions on both sides of the Atlantic of the 
immigration challenges and the appropriate policy responses.  As this thesis shows, the 
similarities and the differences are both instructive to all western and allied policymakers. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. The Context  
Free immigration to and within Europe ended finally with World War I; passports 
were first temporarily issued to control "movement across frontiers" during the war, and 
their use continues today.1  Government regulations, including border controls and "the 
requirement that aliens register upon landing," were accompanied in some cases by sharp 
                                                 
1 Claudena M. Skran. Refugees in Inter-War Europe The Emergence of a Regime. Oxford. Clarendon 
Press. 1995, 32.  
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government immigration restrictions, typically quotas that limited the overall numbers of 
immigrants and aimed to limit immigration from certain ethnic groups.2  This restrictive 
state of immigration affairs, undergirded by prevailing habits of nationalistic 
protectionism and early- to mid-century racial theory, gave way after World War II to 
mass migrations of “displaced persons,” ideological refugees and cheap foreign labor for 
reconstruction. This first generation of immigrants settled into its new circumstances in 
western Europe, but immigrants, asylum-seekers and economic refugees continued to 
come after them.   
Immigration laws did not change in Europe to meet these new circumstances until 
well after the integration process of the European Community/European Union.  In an 
effort to increase trade, the Schengen Agreement in 1985 and the Schengen Convention 
in 1995 provided the catalyst for free movement within the EU by terminating security 
requirements, borders and border controls between the countries that signed the 
agreements and establishing a single external frontier. In addition, in May 1999, the 
Amsterdam version of the Treaty on European Union placed the conditions set forth by 
the Schengen agreement and convention into the EU's "legal and institutional 
framework." Thirteen EU member states accept the Schengen policies, though notably 
the United Kingdom and Ireland have not signed the agreements. On the other hand, 
Norway and Iceland do accept the Schengen requirements, even though neither state is 
currently an EU member.3  
At the same time, security measures are being improved to protect the internal 
security of the EU, including a shared visa system; improved coordination between 
police, customs and judicial systems; and additional efforts to address terrorism and 
organised crime.  The Schengen information system (SIS) has been established to 
facilitate the exchange of data regarding specific individuals who are tracked for the 
purposes of protection, surveillance, warrants or extradition, as well as of data regarding 
specific lost or stolen goods.  There has been coordination within Europe regarding 
                                                 
2 Claudena M. Skran. Refugees in Inter-War Europe The Emergence of a Regime. Oxford. Clarendon 
Press. 1995, 32. 
3 EU Website. 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/freetravel/frontiers/fsj_freetravel_schengen_en.htm. Accessed August 
5, 2007. 
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immigration policies, but immigration continues to have negative effects in and on the 
European Union, the states within Europe and individual citizen as evident by violent 
behavior portrayed in the media. Security concerns remain at the forefront of international 
press accounts, and, indeed, there is still much room for coordinated improvement.4 
The Maastricht Treaty of 1991 demonstrates the resolve of twelve countries to form 
and follow a common immigration policy that extended the areas addressed by the 1985 
Schengen Agreement.5  However, as Silverman noted, "it seems easier to harmonize controls 
than rights."6  This thesis intends to document and offer some solutions to this tension 
between continued immigration and insufficient political and organizational arrangements to 
accommodate it. 
The transparent national borders of the EU countries after the Schengen Agreement 
increased the difficulty of tracking and countering terrorism and drug trafficking; this became 
even more difficult when the large population movements from the former USSR and the 
Mediterranean littoral were also taken into account.7  Indeed, since the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, economic and social conditions—the uneven progress of eastern Europe’s transitions to 
a market economy, as well as increased ethnic and nationalist discrimination in the former 
communist territories—have only encouraged immigration of all types, while an unsettled 
world keeps numbers of refugees and asylum-seekers high. Furthermore, it has been noted 
that "illegal organizations can sometimes thrive within the seclusion of ethnic minority 
communities," as is partially the case within the “parallel societies”8 of ethnic communities 
                                                 
4 EU Website. 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/freetravel/frontiers/fsj_freetravel_schengen_en.htm. Accessed August 
5, 2007. 
5 Grete Brochmann. European Integration and Immigration from Third Countries. Stockholm Sweden. 
Scandinavian University Press. 1996, 88-9. 
6, Maxim Silverman. Deconstructing the Nation Immigration, Racism and Citizenship in Modern 
France. London. Routledge. 1992, 2. 
7Alasdair Stewart. Migrants, Minorities and Security in Europe. UK. Research Institute for the Study 
of Conflict and Terrorism. June 1992, i. 
8 Information based on interview conducted 28 March 2008 with Comparative Domestic Politics 
Professor Dr. Ursula Muench in Munich. 
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in Germany’s larger cities.9  (Similarly, labor market niches may account for the reason 
that foreigners in Spain usually do not move once they are established in a community, 
and certain locations, called “Mediterranean Autonomous Communities,” host the largest 
numbers of immigrants.10) 
 Immigration policies and practices seek to decrease unemployment and increase 
growth, tax revenues and remittances in Europe.  More recently, decision-makers 
acknowledge that immigration will not go away and that policies should focus on the 
integration of all people who live in a nation for the greater good of that country. A 
review of the immigration policies of the EU and Germany reveals that although great 
progress has been achieved, room for improvement remains even today.  
2. Two Broad Debates 
 The debate surrounding immigration in Europe takes two basic, opposing forms 
that are of interest in connection with this thesis.  The first takes a negative view of the 
immigration situation in Europe, advancing the sentiment that foreigners are “taking 
over.”  Right-wing politicians in the EU and its member states decry the "flood of 
immigrants" from North Africa and Eastern Europe pouring over the external border and 
capitalizing on the Schengen-imposed lack of internal passport and border controls. In the 
end, this rhetoric may facilitate the realization of "Fortress Europe" if governments opt to 
engage the right-wing politicians on their own terms.11  
The opposing argument portrays immigration as a benefit, if not a necessity, to 
the state in light of falling birth rates in Europe and the need since World War II to fill 
jobs, especially unskilled labor.12  Proponents of this viewpoint also embrace a European 
                                                 
9 Frank Bovenkerk. "Organized Crime and Ethnic Minorities: Is There a Link?".published in Williams, 
Phil and Dimitri Vlassis. Combatting Transnational Crime Concepts, Activities and Responses. London. 
Frank Cass.2001, 124. 
10 Nieves Ortega Perez. "Spain: Forging an Immigration Policy". Migration Information Source. 
February 2003. pg 3. http:///www.migrationinformaion.org/Profiles/print.cfm?ID=97. Accessed 27 August 
2007.  
11 David Cesarani and Mary Fulbrook. Citizenship, Nationality and Migration in Europe. London. 
Routledge. 1996, 3. 
12 John Salt. Migration and Population Change in Europe. New York. UNIDIR. 1993.19–23. 
Hollifield, James F. Immigrants, Markets, and States. Cambridge, Massachusetts. Harvard University 
Press. 1992. 
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self-image that consciously rejects racial or ethnic boundaries, typically as a vestige of 
the bad old days of nationalist violence, political extremism, war and annihilation. While 
the detractors of immigration emphasize the difference of immigrant populations, 
implying or insisting outright that the newcomers cannot or will not avail themselves of 
European culture, which will suffer as a result, this second argument rather assumes that 
immigrants can assimilate or at least integrate into European society, which can be 
expanded and enriched in the process. This thesis accepts both viewpoints as valid, at 
least on their face, and seeks to improve the security situation by understanding the 
effects of immigration on feelings of nationalism, the economy and crime.   
For all sides of this argument, the key is immigration policy. Scholars have 
contrasted immigrants' integration or assimilation in Europe to the experience of the 
immigrants in the United States and found that the choice (and often the success) of 
assimilation or integration depends on immigrant-related government policies that are 
sometimes voluntary or, more often, mandatory.13 Of course, the initial question is under 
which circumstances immigration should be permitted.  The issue becomes far more 
complicated once the immigrants have arrived.  How should European states affect the 
assimilation or integration of established, resident immigrant populations?  And how can 
or should policy address the frictions of assimilation?  Historically in Europe and in the 
United States, first-generation immigrants are generally law abiding and have contributed 
greatly to the industrial and economic might of their host nations. In some cases, second-
generation immigrants and more often third-generation immigrants resort to both 
economic and violent crime as a manifestation of their frustration with lack of 
opportunities afforded to them due to their failure to integrate into society and sometimes 
due to their perception that the society to which they have immigrated is out to get them. 
Thus, long-term immigration successes have to do with the assimilation or integration 
process.   
 
 
                                                 
13 Gerald Noiriel. The French Melting Pot Immigration, Citizenship and National Identity. 
Minneapolis. University of Minnesota Press. 1996, 266. 
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a. Immigration as a Threat to Europe 
For anti-immigration politicians and advocates, the associations between 
immigration and criminality are clear, irrefutable and paramount to the problem and its 
solution.  Scholars have attributed crime and terrorism in Europe to migration and 
cultural differences that result from immigration.14 Some literature links immigration 
with the incidence of juvenile delinquency.15  
A more sophisticated critical view notes the various effects of crime on 
immigrants to Europe, who generally find themselves on society’s margins, at least at 
first. "Organized crime is fed by the presence of ethnic minorities who furnish a ready 
supply of both victims and offenders … especially when governments and law 
enforcement are weak or corrupt."16 The Council of Europe Vienna Conference in 1991 
recommended harmonization of policies and rules, exchange of information, "active 
collaboration to promote those development policies and measures which would help 
prevent disorderly migration" and coordination of other policies surrounding immigration 
issues.17 Jef Huysmans explained that "Europe seems to be full of acts of violence against 
migrants and refugees and an escalating discourse of 'they are not welcome', or, 'they do 
not belong here'. (The) two images are often linked to another: migrants and refugees 
then become the source of the feeling of insecurity."18 According to the logic of "strain 
theory," which holds that such social constructs as discrimination or poverty thwart an 
                                                 
14 Joshua D.Freilich and Rob T Guerette. Migration, Culture Conflict, Crime and Terrorism. England. 
Ashgate Publishing Limited. 2006, 3. 
15 Ibid., 89-101.  
16 Joshua D. Freilich and Rob T Guerette. Migration, Culture Conflict, Crime and Terrorism. England. 
Ashgate Publishing Limited. 2006, 159.  
17 Alasdair Stewart. Conflict Studies 252 Migrants, Minorities and Security in Europe. Research 
Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism. 1992, 26–7. 
18Robert Miles and Dietrich Thranhardt. Immigration and European Integration The Dynamics of 
Inclusion and Exclusion. London. Pinter Publishers. 1995, 53. 
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immigrants’ efforts to achieve success,19 minorities are more susceptible to committing 
crime than the groups that constitute the majority within society.20   
Viewed from the strain perspective, in principle minorities in a low socio-
economic position are open to the temptations of organized crime. The 
preservation of ties with the home country can give a minority group that 
is able to take advantage of the resources there an objective opportunity to 
earn an ample illegal living. If these two conditions are met and there is 
not enough social control to keep people on the straight and narrow path, 
then a minority is a greater organized crime risk.21 
The problem here is not that the immigrants have different values; in fact 
they aspire to prosperity and status just like any other upwardly mobile resident of 
Europe.  Instead, this more structural-functionalist view posits that they simply lack 
opportunities. Sociologist Robert Agnew lists several conditions that many second- and 
third-generation immigrants experience as strains that induce criminal activity: "failure to 
achieve positively valued goals, dysfunction of expectations and achievements, removal 
of positively valued stimuli, and presentation of negatively valued stimuli."22  All of 
these social circumstances are subject to public-policy remedies. 
Now, it is also true that some immigrants bring their criminal connections 
with them from their former homes.  Separate issues exist here.  First, groups of 
immigrants to a new location often band together in parallel societies. This separation can 
lead to crime. Second and distinct, is the issue of immigrants maintaining and 
strengthening ties to criminal groups in their country of origin. Phil Williams and Ernesto 
Savona hold that the "international community has been slow to come to terms with the 
new challenge posed by transnational criminal organizations," and they note that 
                                                 
19 Larry J. Siegel. Criminology. Thompson Wadsworth. 2006, 197. 
20 Phil Williams and Dimitri Vlassis. Combating Transnational Crime Concepts, Activities and 
Responses. London. Frank Cass Publishers. 2001, 109–124. 
21 Frank Bovenkerk. "Organized Crime and Ethnic Minorities: Is There a Link?".published in 
Williams, Phil and Dimitri Vlassis. Combatting Transnational Crime Concepts, Activities and Responses. 
London. Frank Cass.2001, 122. 
22 Larry J. Siegel. Criminology. Thompson Wadsworth. 2006, 197. 
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conferences have been held to discuss such crime and to identify avenues for 
international cooperation to halt such security-threatening activities.23 
b. Immigration as a Boon to the Nation-State and the People  
Immigration in and to Europe has benefited immigrants greatly in many 
cases over the last century.  Selected literature paints a picture of discontented men 
looking for a better life.24  As long as life is better in Europe than in other countries, 
immigration will continue.25 Many foreigners traveled to Europe; some were expelled by 
force from their homelands and came in search of prosperity and opportunities to live and 
work in new communities after World War II.26 Consequently European local 
communities that had been homogenous both lingually and religiously began to 
incorporate foreigners.27 
Germany faced its first major influx of new populations when the cold-
war divisions of Europe uprooted millions of people who sought refuge on the western 
side of the Iron Curtain.  In contrast to the current immigration situation, "the most 
remarkable feature of the post-war wave of population migration is perhaps the way in 
which the assimilation of these millions of post-war refugees in the compact territory of 
West Germany was accomplished with a degree of successful silence. Integration was so 
complete that there was little or no talk of being 'swamped', of 'floods' of migrants, of a 
'foreigner problem'—largely because the concept of the ethnic German Volk readily 
encompassed those who often spoke in very different dialects and practiced very different  
 
                                                 
23 Phil Williams and Ernesto U. Savona. The United Nations and Transnational Organized Crime. 
London. Frank Cass Co & LTD. 1996, viii. 
24 Mack Walker. Germany and the Emigration 1816-1885. Cambridge, Massachusetts. Harvard 
University Press. 1964, introduction.  
25 Ibid. introduction. 
26 David Cesarani and Mary Fulbrook. Citizenship, Nationality and Migration in Europe. London. 
Routledge. 1996, 90–1.  
27 Ibid., 90–1.  
 10
customs."28 It should be noted that these refugees largely were regarded as German, and 
there was little to no question at the time of their ability to grow into majority German 
society. 
At the same time, as Salt and others pointed out, Germany faced and faces 
demand for seasonal labor that exceeds its homegrown labor capacity. Germany instituted 
a flexible “guest worker” policy through "contracts with East European countries to open 
up three channels by which East Europeans might gain temporary, rotational access to the 
German labor market."29 Some of these guest workers have remained both to man and to 
enjoy the German “industrial and economic miracle” that began in the 1950s and 
continues today, though the integration process here has been uneven across the 
generations.30 In particular, immigration of Turkish guest workers to Germany after 
World War II resounds in literature and news reporting of violence in Germany.31  
Now the Federal Republic confronts the illogic of its third-generation 
resident “foreigners,” but there is no reason for Germans to expect an end to the influx of 
immigrants from ever further afield.  Indeed, if the current demographic trend continues, 
the European workforce is expected to decline dramatically over the next thirty years, and 
the need to fill the labor requirements will continue if Europe "is to keep the financial 
burden of the social welfare system within limits."32 In other words, there are real 
demographic and economic arguments in favor of immigration to Germany and Europe, 
despite the frictions that these population shifts entail. 
 
                                                 
28 David Cesarani and Mary Fulbrook. Citizenship, Nationality and Migration in Europe. London. 
Routledge. 1996, 90–1. 
29 John Salt. Migration and Population Change in Europe. New York. UNIDIR. 1993, 41.  
30 Doris M. Meissner. International Migration Challenges in a New Era. New York. The Trilateral 
Commission. 1993, xi.  
31 Aaron Erlich. "Germany's Second Doubts about its Turkish Immigrants". History News Network. 
11 July 2005. http://hnn.us/articles/12640.html. Accessed 21 August 2007. and Weber, Barbara. 
"Immigration and Politics in Germany". The Journal of the International Institute. Ann Arbor Michigan. 
University of Michigan. http://www.umich.edu/~iinet/journal/vol2no3/ozdemir.html. Accessed 21 August 
2007. 
32 Ekkehard Stemmer. Demography and European Armed Forces. Verlag. Carola Hartmann Miles. 
2006, 36. 
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3. Overall Assessment 
The current immigration policies in Germany, like France and Austria, all include 
objectives related to integration of the immigrant populations to increase security, 
enhance economic growth of the nation and increase feelings of nationalism and pride. A 
thorough review of these policies reveals that the underlying objectives are not being 
entirely met and increased actions on the part of the nation-state and the EU could greatly 
benefit the current situation in Europe. 
Demetrios Papademetriou and Kimberly Hamilton address the complicated issues 
concerning anti-immigrant exclusionary policies and political debates as well as the 
relationship between the native and immigrant populations. Their work fails to provide an 
easy focus area for future analysis and policies but it does offer that "recognizing the 
common challenges that face all diverse societies might be a good starting point" for such 
policy and scholarly discussion.33 The importance of integration cannot be understated.  
"Integration is the fulcrum on which societies ultimately balance; successful societies in 
the next century must resolve the integration puzzle and address the 
admissions/integration nexus more conscientiously than they have to date."34 The “next 
century” has arrived, and Germany, along with the rest of Europe, must now take steps to 
ensure its integration balance. There are opportunities for local, state, and international 
coordination for increased security.35 Indeed, efforts to address negative impacts of 
immigration continue with the national governments and international organizations. For 
instance, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is an 
outstanding institution that is able to assist nations in addressing Europe's immigration 
issues. Since 1991, it has transformed into an "operational institution that works to 
                                                 
33 Demetrios Papademetriou and Kimberly A. Hamilton. Converging Paths to Restriction: French, 
Italian, and British Responses to Immigration. Washington DC. Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace. 1996, 76. 
34 Demetrios Papademetriou and Kimberly A. Hamilton. Converging Paths to Restriction: French, 
Italian, and British Responses to Immigration. Washington DC. Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace. 1996, 76. 
35 Phil Williams and Dimitri Vlassis. Combating Transnational Crime Concepts, Activities and 
Responses. London. Frank Cass Publishers. 2001, 321–362. 
 12
prevent, manage and resolve conflicts within states."36 The international organizations 
can enhance national efforts to address the assimilation issues.  
D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
1. Methodology 
This thesis will describe and analyze the effects of immigration policies on the 
security of Europe through a case study of Germany. Focus falls on violent crime caused 
by and perpetrated against immigrants, immigrant-related economic crime, the particular 
concerns of national identity in Germany (in light of its past and future in Europe) and the 
international context of the problems and their solutions. Using contemporary media 
accounts, official documents, academic studies, and a series of field interviews specific to 
this topic, this thesis investigates the impact of current and possible future government 
actions to address the changing nature of European citizenship due to immigration and its 
connection to security in Europe through an enhanced coordination of immigration 
policies within the EU as well as security sector reform within Germany relative to 
security sector reform within the EU.  
2. Sources 
In the course of compiling this analysis, the author of the thesis reviewed 
numerous academic works on the effects of immigration on security in the course of 
compiling this analysis. As well, the author explored and cited many newspaper and 
journal articles discussing the impact of immigration on Europe and the decreasing 
birthrate in Europe during the formulation of this thesis. The interviews of university 
professors; graduate students; Ministry of the Interior personnel; political party research 
analysts; police officers; and journalists conducted by the thesis author in Berlin,  
 
 
                                                 
36 Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng. Masses in Flight The Global Crisis of Internal Displacement. 
Washington DC. Brookings Institution Press. 1998, 223. 
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Potsdam and Munich in March 2008 add up-to-date information that is not possible to 
glean from purely paper resources. The following questions provided the basic contours 
of the interviews: 
– In what ways are immigrant-related crimes affecting national and local 
politics in Germany? 
– How does immigrant criminality affect the workings of government and 
social institutions as well as civil society? 
– How are immigrant-related crimes affecting other facets of the work of 
government, political parties, interest groups, the press and the police 
force? 
– How does the impact of global terrorism affect the normal work of police 
and public welfare organizations, if at all? 
– How does the enlargement of Europe as well as the conjuncture of 
immigration issues in the wider world show themselves in the definitions 
of citizenship in the EU and Germany? 
– How has the foiled bomb plot in the summer of 2006 revealed itself in the 
work of your agency? 
– How useful are ideas of citizenship, assimilation, and integration to the 
work of your organization? 
– What other patterns of citizenship and due process of law offer themselves 
in this connection? 
E. THESIS SYNOPSIS 
 Five major sections comprise this thesis. The first chapter has reviewed the 
significance of the issue in the context of the historical and economic developments in 
which post-war immigration has assumed its familiar dimensions. The second section 
discusses the effects of immigrant-related crime on the security and prosperity of 
Germany and the failures of the German policies and German government to integrate the 
immigrants fully into German society. The third chapter analyzes immigrant-related 
economic crime and its effects on German economic prosperity. Section IV addresses the 
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effects of German immigration policies on violent crime against immigrants in Germany, 
as it engenders a "sense of siege"37 among immigrants facing what appears to be 
resurgent German chauvinism. The final section offers a summary of German 
governmental and multilateral actions that address immigrant-related crime and 
recommendations for future coordination of immigration policies to enhance security in 
Europe through cooperation of governments and European security institutions.  As this 
thesis concludes, only such coordinated cooperative measures can provide the lasting 
framework for the successful—peaceful—integration of immigrants to Germany and 
Europe. 
                                                 
37 A Sense of Siege is the title of a book by Graham Fuller which concludes that the frictions between 
two societies are likely to occur between those that have opportunities and those who do not. Additionally, 
the book concludes that some immigrants believe that they are under siege—in the book's case by military 
action of the west, but for the case of this thesis the argument can be interpreted to be applied to immigrants 
feeling under attack by the government policies and society of the country which they immigrated to. 
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II. IMMIGRANT CRIME 
A. AN ESTABLISHED AND WIDESPREAD PHENOMENON 
 European and especially German immigration policies have changed several 
times since 1985 in response to labor force and security needs, to say nothing of the mass 
movements of people following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the descent of the 
former Yugoslavia into war and genocide. At the same time, for the last thirty years, 
immigration "has increasingly been perceived as the root of social problems" in Europe.38  
Crime caused by immigrants has affected security in Europe, in terms of increased 
domestic crime, gang and drug activity and the insidious connections between certain 
immigrant communities and terrorism. How to limit such criminality remains an 
important question that demands comprehension of the factors driving crime caused by 
immigrants.  This chapter details the ways in which Germany is plagued by, is 
confronting, and is striving to reduce crime caused by immigrants. 
 It is estimated that twenty-six percent of crimes in Germany are committed by 
immigrants, who only constitute ten percent of the population. "In Berlin, young male 
immigrants are three times more likely to commit violent crimes than their (native-born) 
German peers."39  Germany has witnessed enough unfortunate examples of crimes 
caused by people of immigrant backgrounds that the popular perceptions of an 
immigrant-criminality issue have some real substance. In Munich in December 2007, for 
example, two youths of migrant background beat a retired German school principal in the 
subway after the man asked them to stop smoking in the train, as posted signs and policy 
require.  The act was caught on the subway system’s security cameras and replayed 
                                                 
38 Focus Migration Country Profile France. No 2. Netzwerk Migration in Europa. Hamburgisches 
WeltWirtshafts Institut. Migration Research Group. March 2007, 1. 
39 Deutsche World Website. "Identifying the Roots of Immigrant Crime". 08 April 2006. 
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,1953916,00.html. Accessed 30 November 2007. 
 16
around the world.  German politicians took up the topic of criminality among young 
people, particularly immigrants, amid a discussion of “German values.”40 
The violation of immigration laws contributes to both violent and economic 
crime, as undocumented people cannot seek legal employment.  Two weeks after the 
savage attack against the elderly man, a seventeen-year-old Iraqi and two sixteen-year-
old Palestinian associates were detained, also in the Munich subway, after two young 
German men were kicked and punched severely enough to land them in the hospital.  All 
three of the young attackers had entered Germany illegally in September 2007, though 
they had since submitted their requests for asylum. 
 The Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), the German federal criminal police, publishes 
crime statistics that track criminality among Germans and immigrants. As is the case with 
any crime statistics, the German numbers must be understood as necessarily partial. 
"[T]he extent to which crime goes unreported depends on the type of offense, and this 
can vary over the course of time in response to a variety of factors. Therefore it is not 
possible to assume there is a fixed ration between the number of offenses committed and 
the offences recorded in the statistics."41 The BKA further attempts to limit its 
categorization of criminals by ethnicity or national origin to those cases where the point 
is relevant to the crime.42 "The characteristic 'fellow countryman' should only be 
considered in the case of non-German nationals if the victim and the suspect have the 
same nationality but are neither related to nor acquainted with each other." 43  
Even these incomplete statistics show distinct trends in crime among immigrants 
in Germany.  Figures 1–4 show the incidence of crimes committed by nationals and non-
nationals. In addition the figures show the geographic locations of crime.  
 
                                                 
40 Information contained in this paragraph is based on the author's interpretations resulting from an 
interview with Ms. Csilla Hatvany and Mr. Carl-Philipp Burkert on Wednesday 26 March 2008 1100 
interview in Potsdam. This portion of the discussion was focused on some immigrants' propensity to be 
dangerous. 
41 Bundeskriminalamt. Police Crime Statistics 2006 Federal Republic of Germany Abridged Version.   
42 Ibid.   
43 Ibid.   
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Figure 1.   Victim-Suspect Relationship Totals in 2006.44 
 
Figure 1 clearly demonstrates that murder and manslaughter predominantly occur 
between people who are related, acquainted, or have at least a passing relationship (two-
thirds of the time according to the data in Figure 1).45 Meanwhile, only twenty-five 
percent of all killings happen to people who are not known by the perpetrator.46 In 
contrast, the bulk of the assaults victimize persons unknown to the assailant. Similarly, 
robberies occur mainly to persons who do not know the criminal. 47 These broad societal 
trends inform public perceptions and experiences with immigrant-caused crime.   One 
can conclude that non-nationals who commit extremely violent crimes that end in murder 
most often target other non-nationals in their communities (just as most murders and 
manslaughters in Germany are probably committed by ethnic Germans against other 
                                                 
44 Bundeskriminalamt. Police Crime Statistics 2006 Federal Republic of Germany Abridged Version.   
45 Ibid.   
46 Ibid.   
47 Bundeskriminalamt. Police Crime Statistics 2006 Federal Republic of Germany Abridged Version.   
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ethnic Germans).  Robberies and assaults are most frequently stranger crimes, which 
means a certain incidence of them are likely committed by non-nationals targeting 




Figure 2.   Developments Regarding Juvenile Suspects in Individual Fields of 
Crime.49 
 The data in Figure 2 documents how, over the last two years, there has been a 
decrease in crimes committed by juveniles both of German heritage and of non-German 
heritage. 50 It is unclear at this time if the cause of the decrease among non-German youth 
has anything to do with increased integration requirements by the German government or 
increased efforts by German police and government to limit crime, but either way, the 
reduction of the incidence of crime by both groups is quite positive. 
                                                 
48 Bundeskriminalamt. Police Crime Statistics 2006 Federal Republic of Germany Abridged Version.   




Figure 3.   Number of German suspects per 100,000 inhabitants.51 
 
The importance of Figure 3 is not in the numbers or statistics, but rather lies in the 
caveat above the graph that states that it is not possible to track crimes committed by non-
nationals because there are so many non-nationals in Germany who are not registered, but 
who are in Germany legally through the Schengen agreement, the enlargement of the EU, 
and lax tourist restrictions. 
 
                                                 
51 Bundeskriminalamt. Police Crime Statistics 2006 Federal Republic of Germany Abridged Version.   
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Figure 4.   Crime rates in the Länder of Germany. 
52
 
The geographic representation of the distribution of crime in Germany shows that 
more crime occurs in much of the former East Germany than West Germany, and that the 
large, transitional urban areas see high crime rates. (Berlin, the old-new capital, and Bremen, 
with its chronically depressed port and shipbuilding sectors, are the cities with the greatest 
incidents of crime.) Figure 4 also shows without a doubt that Bavaria and the southerly 
reaches of Germany have the lowest incidents of crime. It is unclear from the BKA police 
crime statistics if this difference relates to residents and visitors in the different regions or to 
political differences between areas. (These crime figures do track generally with the 
distribution of unemployment in Germany.)  In an interview on 28  
 
                                                 
52 Bundeskriminalamt. Police Crime Statistics 2006 Federal Republic of Germany Abridged Version.   
 21
March 2008, a Bavarian police officer emphasized the political and subsequent law-
enforcement differences between Bavaria and other states in the highly federalized 
German republic. 53 
Research shows that "certain areas had consistently high rates of delinquency, 
regardless of which immigrant groups lived there," but as "immigrant groups moved out 
of these areas and into better neighborhoods, their (individual group) juvenile 
delinquency rates fell."54  It is interesting to note the impact of the environment, 
regardless of the social or ethnic group, "within the same type of social area, the foreign-
born and the natives, recent immigrant nationalities, and older immigrants produce very 
similar rates of delinquents."55   
 Conversely, some scholars question whether immigrants commit more crimes 
than their native-born counterparts. Donald R. Taft, for example, concluded that the 
failure of second-generation immigrants to integrate increases the likelihood and the 
occurrence of crime. 56 In contemporaneous contrast, the Wickersham Report,57 found 
that immigrants had lower overall crime rates than non-immigrants, although some 
groups appeared disproportionately involved in specific types of crime."58 Taft's research 
showed that immigrants committed fewer crimes than their native counterparts, but he 
found an increase in crime committed by the offspring.59 Taft published his study, which 
concerned the United States, in 1933, and the Wickersham Report came out in 1929, but 
this work remains applicable to the situation in Germany in 2008, not least because the 
basic debate—whether immigration begets crime—persists to this day. 
                                                 
53 Information in this sentence based on author's discussion in Munich Germany with 
Bundespolizeidirekton Munchen Aufbaustab 1230-1300  28 March 2008. 
54 Romero Martinez Jr. and Matthew T. Lee. "On Immigration and Crime". 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/criminal_justice2000/vol_1/02j.pdf. Accessed 1 December 2007, 7.  
55 Ibid., 7. 
56 Donald R. Taft. Does Immigration Increase Crime? Social Forces, Vol.12. No. 1. October 1933, 
69–77. 
57 The Wickersham Report was conducted in 1929 at the request of President Hoover to look at Crime 
in the United States.  
58 Romero Martinez Jr. and Matthew T. Lee. "On Immigration and Crime". 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/criminal_justice2000/vol_1/02j.pdf. Accessed 1 December 2007.  
59 Donald R. Taft. Does Immigration Increase Crime? Social Forces, Vol. 12, No. 1. October 1933, 
69-77. 
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B. THE LINK BETWEEN IMMIGRANT-RELATED CRIME AND 
TERRORISM 
 Illegal immigration presents a growing security concern in Germany, as in the rest 
of the developed world.  “The perception in Germany is that many… asylum-seekers are 
economic rather than political refugees",
60
 and that much of this immigration is illegal. 
Since 11 September 2001, security has been the focus of immigration issues in Germany, 
particularly after it was discovered that some of the terrorists had lived in Hamburg for 
years before the event.
61
 Three years after the terror attacks on the United States, German 
immigration laws were further restricted to include new powers to the security services 
allowing them to deport suspected terrorists without substantiation.
62  
Germany’s most prominent brush with Islamic-fundamentalist terrorism within its 
own borders was a thwarted conspiracy in September 2006 to make and deploy a large 
number of powerful bombs.  Of the three suspects initially arrested, one was a Turk, 
while the other two were German converts to Islam. For them, then, the question was 
never assimilation or acceptance into mainstream German society; purely the allure of 
extremist violence prompted the converts to undertake such destructive plans.  Still, the 
event added pressure to the security debate as it relates to terrorism, especially among 
Germany’s considerable Muslim minority.63  
Events such as these have inevitably given the security dimension of 
immigration greater urgency, and have confirmed the fears of those 
politicians…, mainly among the CDU/CSU64, who have viewed Islam as a 
threat not only to German cultural identity but to physical security.65   
                                                 
60 Simon Green, Dan Hough, Alister Miskimmon and Graham Timmins. The Politics of the New 
Germany. New York. Routledge. 2008, 104. 
61 Ibid., 104.  
62 Ibid., 104. 
63 Simon Green, Dan Hough, Alister Miskimmon and Graham Timmins. The Politics of the New 
Germany. New York. Routledge. 2008, 104.  
64 The  Christian Democrative Union (CDU) and Christian Social Union (CSU) are conservative 
German political parties. 
65 Simon Green, Dan Hough, Alister Miskimmon and Graham Timmins. The Politics of the New 
Germany. New York. Routledge. 2008, 104.  
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Strikingly, the ruling party in Germany, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), 
tried to minimize the event in their own statements and in the press.  The conspiracy, the 
arrests and the public discourse all make for uncomfortable political discussions in 
Germany.  At issue is an elemental fear of Muslims as too alien to fit into German 
society—which rhetoric flirts dangerously with the racism that twenty-first–century 
observers associate with the Third Reich.  Still, some leaders at both the national and 
community level have begun to address the problems of the simmering social resentments 
in which extremism is believed to flourish. A German Islamic Conference and working 
groups took up their work in 2007, and they plan to meet regularly through 2010. The 
minister for internal affairs has formed a working group. Several German politicians talk 
with the heads of Turkish and other immigrant interest groups.66  
In this connection, interaction between the United States and Germany also has 
gripped headlines regarding a possible terrorist detainee. The U.S. military has held a 
German citizen in Kabul for the past four months for being on a U.S. base without 
concurrence from Germany, as well as for possessing cash in different currencies and 
telephone cards from different countries.67 The U.S. government has asked Germany to 
provide "excessive guarantees" before they release him.68 Similarly, a German-born Turk 
was in U.S. custody from 2001 until 2006 due to U.S. suspicion of his Taliban 
membership.69 These developments add strain to the U.S.-German relationship that 
resonates beyond the security realm. In addition, the leader of the PJAK, a new Kurdish 
party, lives in Cologne and is believed to be in Iran; German security experts are 
investigating whether the group is a terrorist organization.70  There is a fear that a PJAK 
                                                 
66 Information in this paragraph based on author's interview with Dr. Heike Schmidt at Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung in Berlin Germany 27 March 2008. 
67 Spiegel Online Website. www.spiegel.de/international/world/o,1518,druck-548442,00.html. 





partisan/German national could be detained by the Iranian government, thus entangling 
Germany into an unpleasant situation with Iran. 71 
Viewed more broadly, though, Germany’s immigration and security concerns 
track with the experience of much of Western Europe.  The 1995 bomb attacks on the 
Paris Metro ignited fears of Islamic “fundamentalist” violence, which resulted in more 
stringent immigration rules and mass deportations.72 On 11 March 2004, "the Madrid 
attacks relied primarily on homegrown Islamist militants of Moroccan background, aided 
by global jihadists. Most were Spanish residents leading ordinary—even, in some cases, 
socially well integrated lives."73 This phenomenon was particularly evident in the 
London transit bombings in July 2005 (four blasts on 7 July and the attempts at four more 
two weeks later); the perpetrators were all Muslims born and raised in the UK, all with 
good, professional jobs, but all susceptible to the terrible simplifications of Britain’s 
extremist Islamic clerics.  As observers came to realize, London's strategy of "granting 
political asylum to extremist ideologues in 'Londonistan' in return for orderly behavior 
offered no guarantee that their sympathizers would not be transformed, overnight, into 
terrorists."74 Europeans continue to probe the promise and the limits of integration, 
assimilation and extremism among immigrants and their offspring. 
C. IMMIGRANTS BETWEEN SOCIETIES 
 According to Islam expert Dietrich Reetz of Berlin's Center for Modern Oriental 
Studies (ZMO), “The negative images that are projected on Islam have little to do with 
religion, but instead are largely a result of the political problems and social situation of 
the people in question."75   Many migrants perceive a sense of siege on many levels—
                                                 
71 Spiegel Online Website.  www.spiegel.de/international/world/o,1518,druck-548442,00.html. 
Accessed 20 April 2008.  
72Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller. The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in 
the Modern World. New York. The Guilford Press. 1998, 227. 
73 Gilles Kepel. The War for Muslim Minds Islam and the West. Massachusetts. The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press.2004, 248. 
74 Gilles Kepel. The War for Muslim Minds Islam and the West. Massachusetts. The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press.2004, 248. 
75 Spiegel Online Website. www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,druck-548322,00.html. 
Accessed 20 April 2008.  
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economically, culturally, socially and militarily; often they are in search of lost personal 
power.76 While in much of Europe, "immigrant gangs also form as a reaction to ethnic 
tensions in diverse neighborhoods, … provid[ing] physical protection from other ethnic 
based gangs and maintain[ing] ethnic identities in the face of pressures for 
assimilation,"77 Germany sees rather more of a different kind of self-segregation. In 
Berlin, for example, one section of town is populated by mainly persons of Turkish 
heritage and another neighborhood is populated primarily by those of Arabic extraction.  
For the most part, though, the denizens of these neighborhoods have not formed the gang-
like structures found elsewhere in the world.  Instead, they simply function in parallel 
societies where they can remain aloof from majority German culture.78 
 Particularly where these discrete communities are concerned, the German 
Ministry of the Interior and the police forces believe that there is a cultural difference 
between ethnic Germans and Germans of migrant backgrounds/immigrants regarding 
their views of violence. Germans are educated not to use violence to resolve issues; 
whereas generally Turks and Arabs fight to resolve differences, in the prevailing opinion 
of many German law enforcement officials. The immigrants are aware of the local laws 
but they often have little respect for German laws, which do not seem to address the 
grievances at hand. In some cases, Arabs believe that they have their own rules. In Berlin, 
the Turkish groups causing trouble fight against police when the law enforcement 
officials come into the neighborhood to address an issue and unite against the police. 
There are no informants from these areas to assist the police in their efforts.79  
However, to the extent that immigrants are more law-abiding in stable 
environments, these established, if separate, communities may not form the breeding 
                                                 
76 NS 4023 Class notes on Sense of Siege book. Course taught by Professor Zachary Shore.  
77 Romero Martinez Jr. and Matthew T. Lee. "On Immigration and Crime". 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/criminal_justice2000/vol_1/02j.pdf. Accessed 1 December 2007, 7.  
78 Information based on interviews conducted March 2008 research trip in Berlin and Potsdam. 26 
March interview in Potsdam Ms. Csilla Hatvany and Mr. Walker. 25 March Interview with Dr. Heiko Biehl 
and 28 March Munich interview with Comparative Domestic Politics Professor Dr. Ursula Muench. 
79 Information in this paragraph based on author's interviews in Germany during a research trip in 
March 2008. 27 March 1700 Interview with Ministry of the Interior Representative. 
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grounds of the immigrant-crime problem as Germany perceives and experiences it.80 
Indeed, the problems of criminality and extremism among immigrants may not arise so 
frequently in these separated ethnic communities as it does among “in-between” 
populations.  Martinez and Lee concluded that in some cases, integrated youth committed 
more crime as compared to their non-integrated counterparts as a result of alienation from 
both their immigrant community and majority society.81 "Freed from traditional social 
controls, and subjected to social forces that influenced their lives in ways they could not 
control or sometimes understand, some … immigrants exhibit a 'general nervousness' and 
'vague expectation of hostility' that wasn’t common in their country of origin."82 
Research shows that the immigrant criminal doesn’t feel "backed in his dealings with the 
outside world by any strong social group of his own and (was) not conscious of being a 
member of a steadily organized society. (Often) his family (was) too weak and scattered 
to give him a safe social refuge."83 The social exclusion of unemployed Muslim youth in 
Europe, especially in Germany, takes peculiar forms with the so-called third-generation 
immigrants, who are significantly removed from their grandparents’ native culture, while 
lacking full access to German society.84 
The third-generation immigrants are in many cases not making an effort to 
integrate into German society.  The first or second generation immigrants typically 
identified with their own culture within German society; the third generation is not 
especially interested in German culture but wants the benefits of the German welfare 
state.  For example, some third-generation Turks in Germany go to school no more than 
three days a year. Often, they do not speak German, so they do not meet the requirements 
                                                 
80 Information in this sentence based on author's observations in Germany during a research trip in 
March 2008. 
81 Romero Martinez Jr. and Matthew T. Lee. "On Immigration and Crime." 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/criminal_justice2000/vol_1/02j.pdf. Accessed 1 December 2007.  
82 Ibid. 
83 www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,druck-548322,00.html. Accessed 20 April 2008.  
84 Oliver Roy. Globalized Islam the Search for a New Ummah. New York. Columbia University Press. 
2004. 143.  
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for education in German schools.85 New educational systems in Germany are controlled 
by localities, which makes progress on a national educational policy for immigrant 
children difficult.  Progress is uneven. In some areas, children now start at the age of two 
with German and Turkish language training, a trend that started in 2007.  (Before this 
new development, language education typically started at age six.) As with most 
academic subject, the younger children demonstrate more interest in learning than the 
older ones.  Generally, Turkish boys aged fourteen to sixteen just want to be Turkish.  
Some of the Turkish girls aged fourteen to sixteen are already opting out, as well, as they 
don’t want to work but just have children, according to Dr. Heike Schmidt 
(Projektbeauftragte für Zuwanderung und Integration) at the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 
which supports the right-of-center CDU party’s research efforts.86 Rainer Baubock, 
Chairholder in the Department of Political and Social Sciences of the European 
University Institute, recommended that the integration of non-national children is 
possible through their mastery of the local language (in this case German); although his 
findings were hopeful, they also identified resource restraints.87 
D. CRIMES AGAINST AND WITHIN PARALLEL SOCIETIES 
 J. Bade, an historian and expert on immigration from Osnabruck, explained that 
"German immigration policy, which was long opposed to integration, drives immigrants 
into enclaves. A reluctant immigration country shouldn't be too surprised to find that its 
immigrants are sometimes reluctant themselves."88 In this spirit, policies exist to protect 
                                                 
85 Addressing the social problem is the key to unraveling immigrant-related crime, both crimes caused 
by immigrants and crimes against immigrants. Language and education are the two stumbling blocks to this 
end; the issue is not one culture versus another. There is a divide between Turkish and German educations. 
Turkish/German is a dialect that has been created by non-nationals and is indicative of the unemployment 
problem. For many non-nationals the German welfare state is a way to make more money than is possible 
in their country of origin. Information in this footnote based on author's interviews and observations in 
Berlin and Munich in March 2008. 
86 Information in this paragraph based on author's interview with Dr. Heike Schmidt at Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung in Berlin Germany 27 March 2008. 
87  Mark Miller and Barbara Shmitter Heisler. "Europe: The New Melting Pot?" The Nanovic Institute 
for European Studies, University of Notre Dame March 23-24, 1998. International Migration Review. Col 
32. No 2. Summer 1998, 487-490. 
88 Spiegel Online Website. www.spiegel.de/international/Europe/0,1518,druck-547717,00.html. 
Accessed 20 April 2008. 
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immigrant national identity and culture within Germany, which allows the parallel 
societies89 of non-integrating immigrants to exist. (These structures and controls took 
shape in the 1960s and 1970s to address the influx of non-native persons to the areas that 
were recruiting guest workers.) In Berlin, for example, the ethnic communities have their 
own attorneys, medical professionals and shops; business is conducted in Turkish or 
Arabic or whatever the home language is.90   Satellite dishes assist non-Germans to live in 
a parallel society as there are more than forty Turkish-language stations available.91 
"Muslim immigrants' traditional values are reinforced by media outlets controlled by their 
countries of origin."92 Some Muslims in Germany are using pop culture to convey their 
dissatisfaction with the opportunities that are afforded to them in Germany.93 
Unfortunately, the "processes of identity development are behind the insults (within the 
lyrics), and Muslim thugs are simply acting out the rappers' violent lyrics." 94 
                                                 
89 Parallel societies don’t increase nationalism in Germany. Germans just don’t like it. There is a book, 
Die Fremde Braut by Necla Kelek published by Kiepenheuer und Witsch Verlag in Köln 2005, about 
Turkish women going to Germany for forced or arranged marriages to Turkish men already living in 
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contained in an email from Dr. Ursula Munech to the thesis author on 26 May 2008. Sharia law is 
sometimes followed by people of migration backgrounds in Germany but as previously note there is a short 
outrage after a honor crime committed. Information in footnote based on interview with Dr. Ursula Muench 
in Munich on 28 March 2008. 
90 Generally, men are better integrated to work in Germany than women. Language ability is the key 
to opportunity in Germany. Structures and controls were built in the 1960s and 1970s to address the influx 
of non-native persons to the areas that were recruiting guest workers. There was no integration in cultural 
background. Italians were better integrated. It is unknown if this due to religion. Education accounts for a 
difference in an individual's ability to integrate into German society. The elite want to be integrated. 
Coming from Anatolia Turkey, women are not as well educated as from other areas such as Istanbul. Non-
integrating persons using the welfare state without contributing is not entirely true as whole parallel 
structures are contributing for the welfare state. There is higher unemployment in areas with the densest 
immigrant populations, in no small part because of the lack of education and language capability that these 
parallel communities foster. In addition to interview information from Dr. Heiko Biehl the following article 
supports this as well: www.spiegel.de/international/Europe/0,1518,druck-547717,00.html. Accessed 20 
April, 2008. 
91 Information in this sentence based on author's interview on 28 March 1100 in Munich with 
Comparative Domestic Politics Professor Dr. Ursula Muench and from 
www.spiegel.de/international/Europe/0,1518,druck-547717,00.html. Accessed 20 April 2008. 
92 Spiegel Online Website. www.spiegel.de/international/Europe/0,1518,druck-547717,00.html. 




E. CRIME AND EXPECTATIONS WITHIN GERMANY’S IMMIGRANT 
COMMUNITIES 
Family-based immigration remains a hot policy topic.  "Immigration policies are 
often torn between the competing goals of facilitation of family reunion and 
responsiveness to labor market needs…Family-based immigration also facilitates the 
integration of immigrants."95 On the other hand, majority society in Germany has resisted 
family-based immigration for the same reasons that it refuses to recognize itself as an 
immigrant nation.  The whole notion of a “guest worker” rests on the assumption that he 
or she will leave Germany again after some period.  A guest worker with family in 
Germany looks more apt to stay.  Obviously the fact of third-generation immigrants 
means that Germany has accommodated numbers of permanent immigrants in the post-
war decades.  But the public discussion has not always kept pace with these realities. 
Amid the denial of mainstream German society, the immigrant family structure 
has suffered some peculiar stresses, leading to some of the most infamous cases of 
immigrant-on-immigrant crimes. Many immigrant fathers left their families in search of 
employment leaving the eldest son with the monopoly of power in the family.  Their 
pressure on their sisters turned into oppression and sometimes brutality and criminality.96  
Within the separate ethnic communities, oppressed women have three basic 
reactions: over-consuming; taking after their male “models” to force respect; or adopting 
invisibility.97 Many such women wear the headscarf to protect themselves from the 
aggression of men in their ethnic enclaves,98  to gain respect in the community and to 
avoid poor treatment.99  This conscientious separation of immigrant communities from 
majority society—literally and figuratively, in the case of distinctive clothing, reflects the 
                                                 
95Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller. The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in 
the Modern World. New York. The Guilford Press. 1998, 94-5. 
96 Fadela Amara. Breaking the Silence French Women's Voices from the Ghetto. Berkeley. University 
of California Press. 2006, 63. 
97 Ibid., 70-1. 
98 Ibid., 73. 
99 John R. Bowen. Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves Islam, the State, and Public Place. 
Princeton. Princeton University Press. 2007, 225. 
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in-between status of so many young immigrants in Germany.  "A growing assertiveness 
among young people is as much a consequence of the erosion of traditional social 
patterns, coupled with a crisis in the process of integration."100   
The treatment of women remains a focal point of mainstream Germany’s 
understanding of the violence caused by immigrants in Europe. "The media has tended to 
focus on cases that underline the plights of girls caught between two cultures. But if these 
cases (forced marriages, the wearing of the hijab, honor crimes and rape) seem to be 
increasing, it is because Muslim girls are increasingly escaping from their traditional 
position."101   
Again, this self-emancipation, amid the conventions of German society, is a two-
edged proposition.  Many children of migrants "have already begun to take their place as 
educated, activist citizens of Europe and the world. They possess the skills and 
perspective to build bridges… But (some) whose rigid Islamic identity leads them to 
reject cultural integration into the European environment and to embrace cultural 
separatism … and some will pass from voluntary secession into violence."102  
 There are several non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Germany that assist 
immigrants who need shelter from their oppressive families; since 1986, one shelter has 
assisted more than 1,000 immigrant females who have run from their families to avoid 
forced marriages.103  The forced-marriage issue has represents a significant police and 
security issue in Germany. On the one hand, the headlines often trumpet tales of “honor 
killings,” punishment for women who defy family's wishes (by, for instance, dating 
outside the ethnic or religious community or refusing an arranged marriage).  More 
urgently, women with German passports who are forced to marry men they do not know 
                                                 
100 Oliver Roy. Globalized Islam the Search for a New Ummah. New York. Columbia University 
Press. 2004, 139.  
101 Ibid., 139. 
102 Gilles Kepel. The War for Muslim Minds Islam and the West. Massachusetts. The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press.2004, 250. 
103 Papatya Website. http://www.papatya.org/veroeffentlichungen/resourcebook.htm and 
http://www.papatya.org/. Both accessed 24 February 2008.  
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bring unknown persons into Germany under the guise of marriage creating security 
risks.104  More broadly, laws and variously official actions that seem to interpose German 
society between immigrants’ traditional values and social response reinforce the “them 
versus us” mentality that so many immigrants feel as they face the challenges of living 
between cultures.  In upholding the values of free choice and self-realization that it holds 
dearest, Germany puts itself directly at odds with the most rigid interpretations of, in this 
instance, Islamic tradition—the same line of inward-looking irredentist logic that informs 
religious extremism. 
F. CONCORD OR CONFLICT OF VALUES? 
 As high rates of immigration to Europe continue, it is apparent that the European 
quality of life is sought by many people from many places. However, "according to the 
republican way of thinking, living together in a society requires agreement on basic 
values."105 This community of values requires adjustments on both sides of the issue. 
Fear accompanies the integration of immigrants with different values.106 In the 1995 film 
La Haine, three immigrants are depicted as victims of the oppressive Western system. 
Despite efforts to get out, their lives take a tragic turn and they are unnecessarily targeted 
by the local police. Such films, coupled with media headlines of a police car accidentally 
killing two Muslim youths107 perpetuate criticism of the ability of Muslim immigrants 
and western/European societies to coexist peacefully. 
 Unfortunately, reason for this criticism abounds. Oliver Roy's explanation of 
Islam and Islam's interpretation of secular law—namely that the "Shari’a should be the 
sole source of law as well as the norm for the individual behavior, both for the sovereign 
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and for the simple believer"—represents a great impasse for the integration of Muslims 
into European societies.108 Noah Feldman, professor of law at Harvard University, 
optimistically offers that Islamic law could bend to include democratic principles; as he 
specifically stated, "an Islamic democracy could ... decide on just about every criminal 
law by democratic means, and specify the punishments too."109 Islam's requirement of 
the absence of a political authority is counter to the Treaty of Westphalia as well as the 
culture and values of Europe that have taken shape in the centuries since.110 In a word, 
fundamentalism runs counter to the Enlightenment, with its emphasis on reason and 
procedure.  Germany has only recently returned to the fold, as it were, since its own 
exercise in extremism in the Third Reich; the Germans are rightly loath to cash in the 
liberal agenda so quickly again.  
G. A DIVERSITY OF SOLUTIONS?  
 Several academic experts, political party researchers and law enforcement 
representatives interviewed in Germany stated that the key to the immigrant-related crime 
issue was language and education; without these time-honored institutions of 
assimilation111, the non-nationals or German citizens of migration backgrounds were not 
afforded the same opportunities for work as their German speaking counterparts.  
Controversial discussion persists as to whether delinquency of young 
immigrants is the result of failed integration. There is a consensus, though, 
that juvenile crime is a warning signal indicative of problems faced by 
young immigrants. Many hold that crime more generally is a product of 
marginalization and socio-structural deficiencies in society and it is 
plausible that these same variables account for crime among immigrant 
groups.112   
                                                 
108 Olivier Roy. The Failure of Political Islam. Massachusetts. Harvard University Press. 1994, 13. 
109 Noah Feldman. After Jihad America and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy. New York. Farrar, 
Straus & Giroux. 2003, 72. 
110 Oliver Roy. The Failure of Political Islam. Massachusetts. Harvard University Press. 1994, 13. 
111  Information based on author's interviews in Germany in March 2008. 
112 Joshua D. Freilich and Rob T. Guerette. Migration, Culture Conflict. Crime and Terrorism. 
England. Ashgate Publishing Limited. 2006, 99-100. 
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 The German government’s crime reduction efforts should be and appear to be 
focused on addressing the marginalization of immigrants and provide structured social 
support for them, education and language are the first areas that have been identified for 
improvement.113 
 More broadly, Reetz states that the most important thing is that people in 
Germany abide by the legal system regardless of their ancestry or religion. 114  For Reetz, 
mutual trust is important. "Muslims must feel at home here—and we must be willing to 
give them that feeling." 115  As long as Germany’s Muslims are law-abiding, they should 
"have a right to be different.  How far they have distanced themselves from their religion 
cannot be the standard by which they are measured in order to be seen as good 
citizens."116   
To be sure, this dynamic assumes that immigrants want to become German 
citizens. Reetz, among others, noted a decrease in the number of immigrants naturalized 
in Germany in the last few years, which he blames in part on the increase in bureaucratic 
hurdles as well as the enduring cultural and political problems for immigrants.117  "When 
Turkish nationals stand to lose more than they gain through the naturalization process, 
they are unlikely to apply (for citizenship)." 118  Either way, the outstanding question is 
whether the immigrants or their offspring will ever be seen as good Germans, or at least 
good for Germany. 
 Both Steven Castles119 and Shore declare that support of migrants is crucial for 
peaceful integration into society. "The role of the agents and brokers is vital: without 
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them, few migrants would have the information or contacts needed for successful 
migration."120 Castles and Miller, co-authors of Age of Migration, stress the importance 
of family and community as "crucial in migration networks" as "informal networks bind 
migrants and non-migrants together in a complex web of social roles and interpersonal 
relationships ... in order to cope with migration and settlement."121 Shore attributes the 
November 2005 violence in Paris and the July 2005 London Underground suicide 
bombers to "acting out of a sense of alienation from European society."122 Violence 
continues in the suburbs of Paris today and will undoubtedly continue until European 
policies toward Muslim immigrants change (to encourage further integration). Germany 
must take heed. 
 In the event, Germany is addressing this issue head-on at multiple levels. Cultural 
differences remain a divisive issue, but the right of culture and freedom of personal 
liberties is important in Germany. Germany asks about religion and background in 
surveys to help people (unlike France where the issue is scrupulously not discussed).  The 
German chancellor started an integration roundtable two years ago that includes 
representatives from ethnic groups. Federal tests on German history and language started 
in 2006.    
 Unfortunately, the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan has not 
endorsed integration in Germany as he, at a rally in Cologne before the February 
conference on the image of Islam in Germany, "warned his fellow Turks against going to 
far in their efforts to integrate. 'No one can expect you to subject yourselves to 
assimilation', he said. 'Because assimilation is a crime against humanity."123 On the 
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flipside, Minister of the Interior Wolfgang Schäuble is supportive of Muslim efforts to 
integrate; he stated that "Muslims are part of society and our common future."124  
 John R. Bowen125 provided a successful recipe for the integration of immigrants 
when he pointed out that if "the society has the right mechanisms to integrate people, to 
make them into citizens, then the state can be quite generous in welcoming immigrants, 
extending borders."126 In the event, the German constitution has granted the right for 
Islamic entities to receive government assistance to establish centers for worship.127 
Germany's oldest mosque was constructed in Berlin in 1924 and is one of 2,200 mosques 
and praying rooms in the nation (approximately 80 are located in Berlin).128 In 2005 
there were an estimated 3.4 million Muslims in Germany, two thirds of whom had 
Turkish roots.129 Despite the top-level rancor and the dire picture of the crime statistics, 
their peaceful integration in Germany is occurring. 
European governments can reduce immigrant crime by understanding what 
causes crime among non-citizens and foreign-born citizens and negating these influences 
and pressures.  As the German case makes clear, criminals in Europe from other nations 
act violently due to lack of support, belonging and social capital. If German and 
European policies strive to integrate immigrants into their societies while fostering and 
supporting their individual and cultural differences there will be less reason for 
immigrants to act out violently in society and more reasons for them to peacefully 
integrate into society.  
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III. IMMIGRANT CRIME- EFFECT ON THE ECONOMY  
A. EIGHT MILLION AND GROWING 
 Europe, in general, has seen "immigration as inextricably bound up with its 
political, economic and social well-being, as well as its future security interests."130 Even 
though Europe did not plan it, Europe has become an immigration destination, above all 
for economic considerations, with a variety of positive and negative economic effects. 131  
In the interest of political stability and economic gain, the EU is likely to "pursue 
economic integration, steadily incorporating Eastern Europe into [EU] structures."132 
Migration from the east and the south continues, but with that are varying degrees of 
economic prosperity, so the EU and Germany must focus on the "widening prosperity 
gap with Mediterranean rim societies" which could be addressed with economic 
assistance and economic cooperation.133 
Even though the German guest worker programs are over, their demographic 
effects remain current concerns in Germany. Second- and third-generation immigrants 
outnumber first-generation immigrants, even at the height of the guest worker program, 
which shows the importance of the networks that immigrants create.   
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Figure 5.   Percentage of Foreign-Born Populations.134 
 
 Figure 5 shows that more than ten percent of the German population—or eight 
million Germans—are immigrants and according to the latest research from the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), says that "Migration 
is putting growing strains on rich and poor countries alike.  The OECD boss, Angel 
Gurria, says that governments of rich countries must do more to help immigrants 
integrate and make better use of their skills, which will improve economic prospects and 
reduce backlashes against immigrants."
135
 
 Germany continues to serve as a magnet for the unskilled workforce as a well as a 
popular destination for highly educated migrant workers in search of high-paying 
professions; unfortunately in 2008 it also offers a likely location for illegal workers to 
profit and be victimized. In the past, many people entered the area on short-term visas but 
then overstayed the length of their work and residency permissions.136  
 As a result of the Schengen Agreement, Germany granted twice as many short-
term visas than Italy, especially for people from the EU-candidate nations of eastern 
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Europe.137 The German Ministry of the Interior is very aware of the underground 
economy and has dedicated forces to extinguish it.138  
B.  ECONOMIC CRIME AMONG IMMIGRANTS 
Poor social conditions and the marginalization of immigrant groups in the 
host society contribute to and facilitate the migrant-crime relationship… 
migrants are accused of committing more crime than the host population, 
and (of) taking unfair advantage of government benefits... There is little 
doubt that many nations seek to control immigration in the name of 
safeguarding their country against terror.139  
 The Turkish neighborhoods surrounding Sonnenallee Straße in the Neukölln 
section of Berlin have experienced a fifty-percent unemployment rate since 1990.140 In 
the same time period, the rate of robberies and assaults in the area have increased 
threefold. Even in these conditions, many Muslims in Germany fear government 
agencies.  In particular, many Muslim parents worry that sending their children to 
daycare centers will result in them eating pork and merely provide an alternate place for 
the children to sleep.141 Consequently, in these neighborhoods, only about half of the 
children attend daycare,142 even though the German government has trained and 
equipped neighborhood mothers to propagate the correct information regarding the 
daycare centers in the immigrant neighborhoods to ensure that the parents know that the 
children will play, learn German, and go on outings. 143  
 On the other hand, for those immigrants looking to live more in German culture, a 
debate continues about whether Germany provides sufficient incentives for non-citizens 
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to aspire to gain German citizenship. If they do not work at all, citizens in some cases 
receive only 200 euros less per month than if they work a forty-hour week at a minimum 
wage job.144 
C.  THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY 
 The increase in non-integrated immigrants in Europe has led in part to an 
increased focus on the underground and shadow economies and offers another reason for 
increased international cooperation in both crime and immigration arenas. "The 
underground economy involves otherwise law-abiding citizens who are seeking refuge 
from the wrongs inflicted on them by government. They are employers and employees 
who are rendering valuable services without a license or inspection sticker, or failing to 
report their productive activities to the political authorities."145  The German phrase that 
denotes this under-the-table or off-the-books arrangement is “black-working.”  
Restaurants and certain construction projects often employ “black workers.”  The cash 
wages, untaxed, allow people to make ends meet without resorting to violent criminal 
activity or theft, but the fact remains that such workers partake in an economic crime. 
Additionally, they are not contributing to the social services in the local area which they 
live through taxes.146 
For the short term, it appears that the underground economy will continue to 
grow, and combating it will remain under German local law enforcement's purview.  
(Customs and police work together to arrest and deport such illegal immigrants. 147)  It is 
also argued that, "unauthorized immigration has been largely caused by the domestic 
underground economy, which has an important 'pull effect' in a globalized world where 
an unbalanced economic growth in many undeveloped countries is arousing a huge labor 
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supply able and prone to migrating in search of better conditions of life."148 Therefore, 
efforts to combat both illegal immigration and the underground economy in tandem 
should continue. 
 The following four figures show the severity of the shadow and underground 
economies in Germany, both as they have gotten worse over the last five years and how 
the German criminal economy compares to that of other powerful European nations. In 
the last case, the German illegal economies are not gravely different than in other 
European countries. Figure 6 shows that both the underground and shadow economies in 
Germany have been growing. It is important to note from figures seven and eight that not 
only have the shadow and underground economies been growing steadily, but the 
underground economy surpassed the shadow economy in 2001. Figure 9 exemplifies that 
the trend regarding the increases in the underground and shadow economies are felt 
around Europe, and the Italian situation is worse than that in Germany.149 
 
Figure 6.   Shadow and Underground Economy in Germany from 1996-2001.150 
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Figure 7.   Shadow and Underground Economy in Germany from 1996-2001 in 
percentage of official GNP.151 
 
Figure 8.   Shadow and Underground Economy in Germany from 1996-2001 in 
Billions of Euros.152 
                                                 




Figure 9.   Shadow and Underground Economy in Germany as Compared to Italy, 
France and Great Britain from 1996-2001 in Percentage of official GNP.153 
 One of the reasons for the shadow and underground economies in Germany is 
unemployment. The following figure shows that unemployment has continued to rise 
over the past decade in Germany, decreasing legitimate economic opportunities for both 
natives and immigrants in Germany. 
 
Figure 10.   Unemployment in Germany.154 
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 Unemployment has been on the rise in Germany since 1965. Unemployment and 
lack of legal employment opportunities can be cited as reasons a law-abiding citizen 
would change work in the illegal sector.  
 Policy approaches have been discussed to increase the desirability of operating in 
the standard economy of Europe as well as reducing the policies that are seen as penalties 
that could be induced from working in the legal economy of Germany. "A positive 
approach to raise the motivation to stay in the official economy by improving the 
efficiency of public services, reducing the tax and social security burden imposed on 
labor and/or by raising civic virtue has been used only rarely."155 However, increasing 
deterrence to join the non-official economy is the most often method used.156 
Unfortunately, "the relationship between the size of the shadow economy and the amount 
of corruption is strong and consistent."157  
It is quite true that the economic well-being of a nation drives its immigration 
policies, which in turn affect the economy. It is evident that the nations have made efforts 
to control the growth of the underground economy, the shadow economy, the 
unemployment rate and the labor force. Recent national efforts have focused on the 
integration of legal immigrants into all aspects of society. It is hopeful that the integration 
of immigrants and cooperative immigration policies will further decrease activity in 
shadow and underground economies; reduce unemployment and crime committed by the 
immigrants and the native citizens in reaction to immigrants. The efforts in Europe 
deserve admiration, but it is clear that there remains further room for progress to unite 
together in an effort to coordinate policies for the betterment of the people, the nations 
and the region. 
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D.  THE BOTTOM LINE OF IMMIGRANT-RELATED ECONOMIC CRIME 
 In Germany and in other EU nations, immigrants are appreciated when their 
contributions to the economy of the nation are positive instead of siphoning benefits from 
the German welfare state.158 The immigration of labor positively impacted the modern 
industrial might of many nations in Europe, especially Germany and in many cases was 
seen as important militarily; for instance "the nationality law of 1889 was designed to 
turn immigrants and their sons into conscripts for the impending conflict with 
Germany."159 Integrating immigrants into the productive community, be they recruited 
foreign workers or other persons, not only positively effects the purchasing power parity 
of the country they have immigrated to but often positively effects the country of their 
origin through remittances, education and experience if they should chose to return to 
their country. Still, immigration carries with it economic disadvantages as well and 
unfortunately economically challenged immigrant areas have appeared not only in 
Germany but throughout Europe as well.160  
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IV.  IMMIGRATION'S EFFECTS ON GERMAN NATIONALISM, 
CITIZENSHIP, LAW ENFORCEMENT APPARATUS, POLITICAL 
POLICIES AND TERRORISM  
A.  PERCEPTIONS OF THE PROBLEM 
 According to certain cherished stereotypes in Germany, immigrants from Turkey, 
Central Asia, Middle East, Lebanon, and Russia contribute to criminality, especially 
among young people, in Germany. The common view tends not to implicate citizens 
from the United States, France, or Nigeria in drug rackets or the sex trade.  Germans 
typically associate particular immigrant populations with particular crimes. For example, 
persons of Lebanese heritage often work as bouncers at clubs, from which positions they 
can indulge in violence and drug activity, in the popular perception. Similarly, Russians 
who are not integrating well in German society are generally depicted as very cruel and 
lawless. True enough, when the EU started to enlarge in the east, there was an increase in 
prostitution from Eastern Europe and assaults by Eastern Europeans, especially in Berlin.  
The tabloid generalization now holds that most young Russian men are pimps or 
enforcers in prostitution enterprises.  Many Germans are suspicious of immigrants of 
Arabic descent out of similar guilt-by-association perceptions.   
Germany’s longest-standing non-European minority occupies a particularly 
complicated position in the popular imagination.  On the one hand, the German on the 
street likely will assert that Turks create problems in Germany when they are 
unemployed. However, it is also a common notion that half of the Turks in Germany 
integrate easily into German society and contribute to German society at large.  Often, the 
friction is articulated in terms of Germany’s ponderous social-welfare system.  Turkish 
citizens in Germany have access to the German welfare system by dint of being in the 
country (immigrants who are not citizens have every right except the franchise) but they 
do not contribute if they are not participating in the legal job market and paying taxes.161 
                                                 
161 Information based on author's interview on 26 March with Hanns Seidel Stiftung Representative 
Mr. Hebeker and Journalist Dr Ina Verstl. 
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Federal reports, notably from the Ministry of the Interior, tend to underplay 
cultural differences and emphasize integration.162  On the other hand, there is no German 
political consensus regarding assimilation or integration.  From 1945 until 2006, 
Germany refused to recognize itself as an immigrant nation.  Guest workers in Germany 
did not have the option to pursue dual citizenship in the 1950s or now.  Currently, there is 
no political or social pressure to accept or seek German citizenship.  
A certain amount of cultural assimilation does resonate among thinkers and 
policymakers concerned with immigration in Germany.  Liberal leaders focus on education 
and language; often third-generation Turkish immigrants refuse to learn German and there 
remains no apparatus to enhance the appeal for many young immigrant of learning the 
notoriously unlovely language.  The mere fact that one must speak German to qualify for 
most jobs in Germany has not, so far, driven all young immigrants to the nearest language 
schools. 
 Generally speaking, a consensus exists among German citizens that people can live in 
their own culture if they accept German laws and the western sense of civil rights and shed 
such “holdout” social issues as Islamic sartorial requirements of women as well as Shari’a 
law.  German government employees do not wear headscarves, though the matter in 
Germany is subject to the decisions of the various federal states and, indeed, different 
companies.  
Immigration figures significantly in German politics today, though the issues have 
changed significantly from the base, anti-foreign rantings of the far-right that characterized 
the discourse some years ago.  For example, in the February 2008 state elections in Hesse, 
the CDU lost due to this single issue. Specifically, the conservative candidate campaigned on 
immigrant youth and crime as pressing problems in the populous and prosperous north-
central German state. The voters rejected the hard-line proposals floated during the 
campaign, as well as the candidate who espoused them.  (A special CDU team worked this 
issue from December 2007 until 14 March 2008, and the findings have been published. 
Although the author of the thesis was unable to obtain a copy of the findings, it remains 
important to note the CDU has placed on the issue to conduct an in depth study.)  The next 
                                                 
162 Information based on author's interview on 26 March with Hanns Seidel Stiftung Representative 
Mr. Hebeker and Journalist Dr Ina Verstl. 
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elections will be in 2009. The CDU does not plan to talk about immigration until after the 
election because they are worried about being seen as too harsh to immigrants.163 
B. THE ROLE OF HISTORY  
 German history, particularly the legacy of illiberalism, genocide and war from the 
1920s, 1930s, and 1940s echoes in hearts and minds of Germans on a daily basis. This 
not-so-dead past culminates in the record of officially sanctioned crime directed at non-
Germans during the Third Reich. Thus history shades most German statecraft even today, 
including the current policies that address immigrant-related crime. Germans in 2008 
have embraced their history and the “never again” mindset that this responsibility entails 
by making the Nazi concentration camps into national monuments, which school-aged 
children are required to visit. These memorial sites (Gedenkstätten) require no fee for 
entrance, making the monuments accessible to all visitors, regardless of economic status. 
The Topography of Terror exhibit, an open-air historic installation in central Berlin, 
provides an abrupt, accurate and unforgiving look at the atrocities that were planned in 
the same location under the Third Reich.  Similarly, the German capital has dedicated 
nearly five acres of prime, central-city real estate to an imposing Holocaust Memorial, 
which, standing not far from the Checkpoint Charlie Museum, serves to remind 
lawmakers, diplomats and domestic and international visitors of the gravity of the 
German past.  Even outside the German cities, in non-tourist areas, prominently posted 
descriptions of atrocities against non-Christians and non-Germans can be found very 
easily.164 
 Nonetheless, as Chapter II of this thesis has demonstrated, immigration remains a 
fraught issue for Germans, particularly where crime by and against non-Germans is 
concerned.  The way in which immigrants are seen through the eyes of native Germans 
hinders integration, but in the shadow of the Nazi legacy, Germans remain uneasy 
                                                 
163 Information in this paragraph based on author's interview with Dr. Heike Schmidt at Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung in Berlin Germany 27 March 2008. 
164 Information in this paragraph is based on this author's observations in March 2008 during a 
research trip to Berlin, Potsdam, Dachau, and Munich, Germany. And from author's interview on 26 March 
with Hanns Seidel Stiftung 's Mr. Hebeker and Journalist Dr Ina Verstl in Berlin. 
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discussing their views of non-Germans among them.  Of course, functional democratic 
polities can have real concerns.  "Immigration of culturally diverse people presents 
nation-states with a dilemma: incorporation of the newcomers as citizens may undermine 
myths of cultural homogeneity; but failure to incorporate them may lead to divided 
societies, marked by severe inequality and conflict."165 In the German case, the 
undertones of social or even official racism that may attend the discussions of this 
dilemma tend to complicate the domestic and international discourse. 
The problem does have both a domestic and an international component.  It was 
one thing when the country had to absorb ethnic Germans from newly mapped neighbor 
states or to accept variously dusky “guest workers” to help rebuild the economy and then, 
it was understood, go home.  In the years since Germany’s “economic miracle,” however, 
the demography of immigration has changed to include ethnic Germans from across vast 
geographic and cultural differences, political refugees, asylum-seekers, and others hoping 
to make their way amid Germany’s conspicuous prosperity.  Here, Germany shares the 
European view:  "[I]t is widely believed in Western Europe that asylum-seekers are really 
economic migrants, using claims of persecution as a way of evading immigration 
restrictions. This has led to popular resentment and extreme-right campaigns and violence 
against asylum seekers."166 The enlargement of the EU has changed the status of some 
asylum-seekers (and often their dependents) into full legal residents of Germany—and 
citizens of Europe who are free to move and work throughout the EU. 
Illegal immigration poses its own set of problems.  When Spain approached the 
EU for financial assistance in dealing with its illegal immigrants in the Canary Islands, 
citing the spillover effects of illegal immigration in Italy and Malta, Germany took a dim 
view. 167  After all, the Germans reasoned that they had to “accommodate” more than 
                                                 
165 Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller. The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in 
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448,000 illegal immigrants up until September 2006 without EU assistance.168  The 
combined impressions of economic opportunism, false claims of persecution and outright 
flouting of German or European immigration policy figure in much of the anti-foreigner 
rhetoric that floats into the popular media from the far-right parties and even the right-
wing mainstream.   
Before unification, East Germany saw a handful of immigrants, mostly refugees 
from conflicts in “socialist brother-nations,” notably Vietnam and Angola.  Since 1991, 
the population of the former East, itself neck-deep in the pressures of social, political and 
economic transition, has had to accept an unaccustomed influx of immigrants, legal and 
illegal, from eastern Europe and beyond. Right-wing political parties incited some East 
Germans to resort to violence against non-Germans, as part of a larger program of 
disaffection and protest. While the majority of the citizens of eastern Germany have 
maintained a more enlightened approach, the “wild east” did and does see proportionally 
more anti-foreigner violence.  The specter of resurgent racist violence continues to haunt 
the political discourse.  West German politicians were quick to point fingers, but West 
Germany, even in the 1980s, was not as cosmopolitan and integrated as many people 
thought according to Dr. Heiko Biehl of the German Command and Staff Academy in 
Hamburg.169 
C. THE CHALLENGES OF CITIZENSHIP, NATIONAL IDENTITY AND 
NATIONALISM 
 The table below provides an overview of German policy changes regarding 
immigration and asylum. 
 
 
                                                 
168 Your Link to Germany. http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,2180188,00.html?maca=en-bulletin-
433-html. Accessed 24 February 2008. 
169 This paragraph is based on author's interview with Dr. Heiko Biehl in Berlin on 25 March 2008. 
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Table 1.   German Policies Regarding Immigration.170 
Date Policy/Comments 
1913 Citizenship law—imprecise criteria 
1935 So-called Law for the Protection of German Blood and Honor 
and the Reich Law on Citizenship put Nazi racial law firmly in 
hand. 
1951  Asylum provision in the Basic Law were more strict than the 
Geneva Convention provisions. West Germany implements 
restrictive interpretations. 
1977  Clear naturalization guidelines were created under a joint 
federation Lander commission later referred to as the foreigners 
policy (or Ausländerpolitik) : 
1. Long residence period 
2. High fees 
3. No dual citizenship 
1990 German unification. Unified Germany received highest number 
of asylum-seekers in the EU (1.2 million applications 1990–3) 
1992 Maastricht Treaty included EU-level cooperation on immigration 
and asylum 
1993 German 1993 reforms restricted asylum more than EU policies 
1999 Amsterdam Treaty put immigration and asylum under the “first 
pillar.” German domestic support diminished 
2004 First full-scale immigration law drafted 
2005 First full-scale immigration law takes effect: 
1. Provides structure for migration management 
2. Includes compulsory integration  
2006 Asylum applications received only 30,000 
2008 Since 1990, 1.6 million non-nationals have become German 
(most vote for the left-of-center Social Democratic or Green 
parties) 
 
                                                 
170 Table Created by author based on information in Simon Green, Dan Hough, Alister Miskimmon 
and Graham Timmins. The Politics of the New Germany. New York. Routledge. 2008, 105-126.  Please see 
Appendix for a list of laws under the Third Reich directed at Jewish Citizens. 
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 In 1991, German nationality was redefined as people with deeply buried German 
roots who came to Germany from the former Soviet Union. German citizenship was 
granted to those who had German parents or grandparents, even though the applicants 
often spoke no German and had few cultural connections to Germany. These “Russian 
Germans” have proven, as a group, much harder to integrate than previous immigrations 
of displaced ethnic Germans. The efficacy of the policy granting them citizenship—and 
the frauds and abuses to which it has fallen victim—remains a public issue.  
In these same years, Germany saw a massive increase in all kinds of immigration, 
especially asylum-seekers—with more than a million arrivals in the years 1990–1993.  In 
1993 "after an emotional political and public dispute, and against the background of anti-
foreigner violence and rising support for extremist parties, the constitutional right to 
asylum was restricted by a cross-party compromise. In the following years, the number of 
asylum applications dropped sharply."171  Six years ago, laws changed and now require 
immigrants’ children to decide by the age of eighteen which citizenship to keep (Turkish 
or German).172   As eastern Europe stabilizes and the Schengen border is improved, the 
flow of people into Germany has abated, anyway.  Ironically, in this quieter period of 
immigration, Germany has finally recognized itself as an immigrant nation (2006).173 
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172 Information in this sentence based on author's interview on 28 March in Munich with Comparative 
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D.  LACK OF ASSIMILATION AND INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS 
AND ITS EFFECTS ON CRIME 
 The issue of assimilation and immigration in Germany cannot hide from the news 
headlines as violence has resulted from unsuccessful cases. Tension surrounds German 
policies regarding immigration.174 Germany expects immigrants and non-nationals to 
assimilate, but due to the memory of the holocaust Germany remains unable to require 
assimilation.175 The creators of German policy expect immigrants and non-nationals to 
want to become German for nationalistic and personal reasons.176 Before 2000, German 
citizenship policy traditionally had "been based on the assumption that non-nationals 
must be integrated before obtaining German nationality, which cannot therefore be 
considered as a stepping stone to integration."177 Some non-nationals in Germany 
experience a disadvantage in German society. In general, non-nationals have higher 
unemployment levels, less education and "inadequate language skills, without which it is 
difficult for individuals to improve their situation, thereby creating a vicious circle of 
marginalization."178 Some scholars of German politics conclude that it is a moot point 
whether the deficiencies in integration of non-nationals in Germany can be put down to 
their unwillingness to adapt, or to the reluctance of Germans to accept immigrants as 
equals in society, restrictive citizenship laws and by the absence prior to 2006 of any 
explicit anti-discrimination legislation. The important point is that political parties across 
the spectrum now accept that a more active integration policy, to include formal language 
and citizenship classes, the successful completion of which is linked to the individual's 
residence status, is indispensable.179 
A non-national's desire to assimilate often results in violence from within the 
immigrant community in Germany.  In Germany, six 'Honor Killings' occurred within a 
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four-month period in 2005 whereby women of Muslim descent were murdered by their 
families due to their adoption of Western views and lifestyles.180 The German courts 
prescribed appropriate verdicts and punishments for those found guilty of such crimes. For 
instance, in 2006 a man was given a nine-year and three-month prison sentence for the 
murder of his sister (who he shot in the head due to the fact that she left the cousin that she 
was forced to marry a year after their wedding pregnant and fled back to Berlin to raise her 
son on her own, without wearing a headscarf and then sought education).181 In 2007, there 
was a Sharia law divorce case which highlighted that honor crimes do happen in Germany. 
Famous German lawyer of Turkish decent, Seyran Ates, had to spend two years under ground 
after the court case due to fear of reprisal.182   
 This phenomenon is neither new nor unique in Germany. Papatya, a NGO that 
supports Turkish immigrants in Germany with the financial backing of the German 
Government, recorded forty honor killings in Germany between 1996 and 2005.183  
Immigration is a clear economic, cultural and, in the light of 9/11, security 
threat. The decision of Germany, along with Austria, to impose seven-year 
restrictions on the free movement of workers from the eight new Central and 
Eastern European member-states of the EU from 2004 must be seen in 
precisely this context.184  
 Illegal Immigrants can ask for asylum and then they get one more chance, some 
resort to crime at that point because if they get caught again they are flown out of Germany 
anyway. Over ninety-five percent of cases don’t get asylum as most are economic refugees 
and those who are granted asylum status are granted it of an additional (usually political) 
reason. Homosexuals can ask for asylum depending where they are from this is considered 
political issue asylum. One to two years after they ask for asylum they are usually processed 
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through the system. If denied they can appeal and go to court, if the court denies them 
they can appeal and go to a higher court again- this process allows them to remain in 
Germany for quite a while after they are found by the police.185 
 The German public tends to view Islam in a negative light, as many associate 
Islam with fundamentalism, violence and female oppression.186  The following table 

































Figure 11.   German Public Opinion about Islam.188 
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E.  TERRORISM 
 Amid these statistics, the question remains whether Germans worry about all 
Muslims or only the visibly distinct Muslim residents of the parallel societies in larger 
cities.  Tellingly, decades—generations—of experience with the Turkish minority in 
Germany has done little to assuage popular misgivings about Islam, particularly with the 
persistence of a fundamentalist terrorist threat. 
 Conservative political parties in Germany want more strict laws to watch for 
terrorism. The German secret service requires specific rights/laws to infringe on private 
lives of those in Germany. There is no drive to fix the laws to enable national police to 
have increased power regarding people's civil liberties. In Germany, the secret service 
addresses terrorism. Specific environments are important, certain areas of Berlin are 
impacted by immigrant-related crime, where as other areas are not and this impacts the 
police enforcing laws in those areas.189  
 During the week of 17 April 2008, German law enforcement and security officials 
agreed to enact new computer surveillance regulations aimed at terrorism and other 
serious crimes.190 Although this proposal still requires consideration by state 
governments, approval by federal cabinet members, and ratification by both houses of 
parliament, the Islamic leaders in Germany are very sensitive to this prospect and are 
speaking out against it.  According to the proposed provisions, Muslims in Germany will 
not be afforded the same exemptions from official monitoring as their Christian 
counterparts.191 The reason for the difference is a legal one, as "the Catholic and 
Evangelical churches in Germany have state-recognized status….  Islam does not 
currently hold that same official status in Germany."192  However, within the German 
Islam Conference, Muslim leaders are seeking to gain that state recognized status.193  
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It is essential to note that if there is just cause to monitor the Christian clergy in Germany, 
current German legislation allows for such exceptions to the rule in the name of 
security.194  
In February 2008, "German federal judges … declared it illegal for government 
snoops to use virus software to gather data from an individual's hard drive—except for in 
extreme cases such as a terrorist threat."195  That same month, German Minister of the 
Interior Wolfgang Schäuble stated that due to the spontaneous nature of the formation of 
terrorist groups and planning of violent activity surveillance of online activities is 
important for the War on Terrorism; furthermore, he stated that the German public 
believes it is not being targeted by terrorists, contrary to government warnings.196 In his 
July 2007 Spiegel interview Minister Schäuble stressed the ability for German laws and 
the German constitution to adjust to the threats of society in order best to protect 
citizens.197 
F.  TERRORISM’S EFFECTS ON GERMAN LAW AND LAW 
ENFORCEMENT APPARATUS198 
 Intelligence and police functions are divided in Germany, in response to 
historically dictated rules and regulations.199  (The excesses of both the Third Reich and 
the East German security apparatus affect these policies.) More power and cooperation 
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between the two functions would change the balance too much and make the German 
population uncomfortable. German police officers must be German and swear on the 
constitution. All police are German, with a few exceptions for people of Turkish heritage.  
Most police officers speak only German.200  However, English has been incorporated 
into police basic training so that English can be used in police business where needed. 201 
Working with EUROPOL affects German law enforcement apparatus only. The 
Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) is the German equivalent of the U.S. FBI but the BKA does 
not have an intelligence division. The Joint Counterterrorism Center tries to bring 
together these two things, but analysts and police remain separate.  There is a divide 
between operators and analysts. Analysts want to wait as long as they can to get as much 
information as they can before handing it to the operators to bust the activity. The 
Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz (BfV), the German Domestic Security Intelligence 
Service, monitors threats to the German Constitution, has no executive powers, and is 
completely separate from the BKA. Trennungsgebot is the German law that mandates the 
separation of law enforcement and intelligence assets. 
Intelligence does not track criminal activity unless it is politically motivated. 
Immigrant-related crime is not politically motivated; it is police work. The 
Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) is the Federal Intelligence Service that concentrates on 




Nonetheless, some joint actions have taken place.  On 23 April 2008, 130 German 
police in Berlin, Bonn, and other areas conducted raids against nine suspected Islamist 
men, who were also suspected to be spreading extremist material and to have attempted 
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recruiting efforts for fighting in foreign lands.  (They did not arrest the nine men.203) 
Such searches are not a new phenomenon in recent German history. "According to 
Germany's Deutsche Welle, the searches focused on a community of Muslims in the 
southern city of Neu-Ulm which has been repeatedly raided in recent years during anti-
terrorism investigations."
204
 Past actions by the police have resulted in the closing of 
cultural centers (for example, the Multi-Kultur-Haus) if they are evaluated to threaten 
security in the nation.
205
  "A statement from the prosecutor's office said the suspects 
aimed "to Islamicize and radicalize Muslims and non-Muslims—particularly Germans 
who have converted to Islam".
206  
The U.S. State Department has acknowledged the tremendous efforts that 
Germany has made: "Germany has placed a particular emphasis on supporting UN 
counterterrorism activities and topics such as terrorist use of the Internet, protecting 
critical energy infrastructure, and countering radicalization and recruitment to 
terrorism."
207
  For both terrorism and more local crime connected to immigrants, 
Germany may look to this interagency and cooperative framework for ways to improve 
its responses and its record further. 
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V.  THE GERMAN INTERNAL AND COOPERATIVE SOLUTION 
TO THE REDUCTION OF IMMIGRANT-RELATED CRIME 
A.  WORKING TOGETHER OR APART ON ECONOMIC CRIME 
 It is important to address whether a country's policies are more affective on their 
own or more effective when supplemented by an international institution. The parallel is 
drawn between the need for coordination between nations regarding transnational crime 
and immigration policies as illegal immigration is both caused by and leads to an increase 
in the underground and shadow economies as well as increased crime. A review of 
institutions' ability to adapt in order to effectively address the current issues shows that 
organizations in Europe are able to transform to address the need for a coordinated 
immigration policy. The need to coordinate can then be applied to the arena of 
transnational crime policies as compared to the international efforts spearheaded by the 
international and regional institutions that exist today. The institutions roles in addressing 
transnational crime within the continent of Europe demonstrate how cooperation 
regarding crime should be executed and how institutions could also be used by European 
nations as a backbone for regional immigration policy coordination.  
 Simon Hix, Professor of European and Comparative Politics, Department of 
Government at the London School of Economics and Political Science, explained that 
through the use of immigration and asylum-related controls, social integration is arrived 
at more effectively than through anti-racism policies and race-relation dialogue.208 
Furthermore, he supported the cooperation of EU countries in the realm of migration and 
security policies so that individual nations could act collectively without the restraints 
imposed by its citizens, political groups and resource limitations.209 "The domination of 
agenda-setting by interior ministry officials rather than justice ministry officials or 
interest groups representing migrants or business interests was one of the main reasons 
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why the debate on migration was framed in terms of security or control rather than rights 
or freedoms." Under the Trevi, Schengen and Maastricht Treaties, security policies 
covered immigration and asylum issues.210  
Traditionally the state has maintained internal security through controls on 
who enters its territory. In a single market with open borders this is no longer 
feasible. However security forces can also control populations regardless of 
where they reside, through information exchange on criminal activities and 
asylum seekers, common strategies on identity cards and police authorities. 
These 'compensatory measures' were first discussed in the context of Trevi 
and Schengen and form the basis of EUROPOL.211  
The Amsterdam Treaty has allowed EU supranational actors to collaborate on security issues 
outside of the realm of sovereignty of the individual governments which allows issues to be 
resolved more quickly. 212 
The EU does not have the Exclusive right to decide who can be an EU 
citizen. Howeve,r with the completion of the single market, EU institutions 
have established and are responsible for governing a set of common economic 
rights for national of the member states, based on the freedom to move 
between countries, seek employment, trade, and provide and consume 
services. Furthermore, with the establishment of EU citizenship in the 
Maastricht Treaty and the extension of these provisions in the Amsterdam 
Treaty, the member states are no longer independent from the EU polity in 
determining who may receive social, civil and political rights in the 
system.213 
Consensus and cooperation among EU nations is greater now in light of the shared EURO 
and shared open borders. "Growing demand by the European electorates for action to fight 
cross-border crime and control immigration gave the governments a window of opportunity 
to adopt common policies in a traditional area of politics."214 
 It is evident that in the past two years, the regulations regarding immigration have 
become more stringent and are the focus of much attention by the German political 
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parties. Two-thousand seven marked an increase in family reunification regulations 
which included spouses speaking rudimentary German and a maximum age of sixteen for 
immigrating children; of note two German political parties desired a much lower age 
limit.215  
 The conditions are already in place for European Security Institutions to 
cooperatively address the risks associated with immigration especially as they affect the 
intertwined economies of EU nations. A collective effort is more effective than separate 
national policies regarding immigration to increase security and decrease crime in the 
region as many crimes and criminals and illegal funds cross international borders. Since 
the Schengen Agreement in 1985, the borders of the EU have become more porous and 
the member countries have agreed to coordinate with each other to enhance security 
within the EU. Currently, security institutions exist in Europe that are well suited to 
provide a foundation for increased international interaction on coordinated immigration 
policies that may be able to effectively reduce or even halt immigrant-related economic 
crime.   
 More recently, European and more specifically German policies have acknowledged 
that immigration is a phenomenon that is permanent and therefore policies should focus on 
the integration of all people that live in a nation for the greater good of that country. Stephen 
Castles and Mark Miller summarized the reasons why people migrate that are quite 
applicable to Europe in their 1998 book The Age of Migration: International Population 
Movements in the Modern World as follows: "Growing inequalities in the wealth between the 
North and South are likely to impel increased numbers of people to move in search of better 
living standards; political, ecological and demographic pressures may force many people to 
seek refuge outside their own countries; increasing political or ethnic conflict in a number of 
regions could lead to mass fights; and the creation of new free trade areas will cause 
movements of labor, whether or not this is intended by the governments concerned."216 The 
immigration policies of Germany will be reviewed to conclude that great progress has 
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been achieved, but room for further improvement regarding the reduction of immigrant-
related economic crime remains even today.   
The bicultural second- or third-generation offspring of the foreign 
workers of yesteryear were becoming hyphenated - Franco-Maghrebis or 
turco-Germans. The culturally hybrid younger generations suggest the 
reality of something resembling a melting pot... One problem facing 
Europeans is how to determine how or when external controls (of 
immigration policies) are working sufficiently…some view immigration as 
part of global transformation. … (Sarah) Collinson217 stressed linkages 
between migration and security… She argued that the preoccupation with 
security accounted for many of the problems in crafting common policies 
but also, ironically, for what progress that had been made. Collinson does 
not feel that there is a clear mandate for a common policy nor is there an 
institution to implement it.218 
Germany uses the EU, EU's CEPOL, EU's EUROJUST and EUROPOL219 to 
address immigrant-related crime within Germany. Additionally, German political party, 
law enforcement apparatus and research institute ideas have been implemented to address 
immigration-issues within German borders. The meaning of citizenship in the EU has 
gained importance since the end of the Cold War, the rise of turmoil around Europe to the 
south and east and now with immigrant-related crime.  The impact of the debate 
regarding possible future German government actions to address the changing nature of 
German citizenship due to immigration and its connection to security in Europe through 
an enhanced coordination of immigration policies within the EU and other European 
organizations will be discussed. This chapter summarizes the different opinions of 
German political parties, law enforcement organizations, and German research institute 
ideas regarding this issue. The conclusion summarizes how the actions of German 
government organizations have promoted and will continue to promote a more secure 
environment while protecting national and economic interests. The overall questions that 
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this chapter seeks to answer are:  How do immigration policies in Germany affect crime?  
And how can security be increased through policy implementation and coordination 
among German and European organizations?   
B.  LANDESKRIMINALAMT & BUNDESKRIMINALAMT220   
 German law enforcement offices are ready and able to assist in combating 
immigrant-related crime when desired. The "behavior-oriented prevention" department of 
the Berlin Landeskriminalamt (LKA) has cooperated with NGOs regarding incidents of 
domestic and sexual violence and is well placed to address Honor Related Violence 
(HRV) if "it was politically wanted" by the citizens, voters and politicians in Germany.221 
The safety of citizens is high on the LKA's agenda.222  The Berlin LKA meets with other 
LKAs and the sharing of information for cooperation is possible at these frequent 
venues.223 The Bundeskriminalamt's (BKA) jurisdiction includes cross-border crime.224 
In cases where international coordination is required, "the BKA sends cooperating 
officers to EUROPOL meetings (such) as the EUROPOL conference on HRV at The 
Hague in June 2004."225   
C.  GERMAN POLITICAL PARTY VIEWS OF IMMIGRANT-RELATED 
ISSUES 
 The political situation in Germany is both unique and interesting. German 
political parties address the issue of immigration and immigrants, but in a slightly 
different way within their party documents.  
The two-and-a-half-party system that characterized German politics for 
the majority of the post-cold war era is now a thing of the past. Two 
medium sized (CDU/CSU and SPD) and three smaller (FDP, the Greens 
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and the Left Party) parties now garner enough votes to make coalition 
formation- and consequently governing in general - a much more complex 
task than it used to be.226   
One of the Christian Democratic Union's (CDU) key policies in its new party 
principles is immigration.227  The CDU stresses the need to integrate immigrants into 
German society, not at the cost of a "disregard for rule of law" or as a "parallel society" 
but to share values and accept cultural diversity.228   
The background documents for the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) 
directly emphasize the need for foreigners and their children to integrate into German 
society.229  According to the SPD, German institutions should foster equality and 
solidarity for all citizens.230 The SPD calls for co-education of foreigners with Germans 
to reduce prejudice and discrimination.231 The Basic Policy Program of the SPD stresses 
the importance of government's role as the "guarantor of cultural variety" and stresses 
that the government should not be the "guardian of culture".232 However, the SPD does 
hold that the EU should "safeguard a diverse European identity by promoting regional 
and national culture."233  
The Free Democratic Party (FDP) appeals to many Germans as the center party 
which "moderat(es) the policies" of the CDU/CSU and the SPD.234 The FDP strongly 
supports the "legal protection of individual freedoms."235  The FDP follows a secular  
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agenda, supports private business and frowns on socialist tendencies.236 The FDP has 
"remained closer to the CDU/CSU on economic issues and closer to the SPD on social 
and foreign policy."237  
The Christian Social Union (CSU) is an influential conservative political group of 
Christian Democrats in Bavaria.  In March 2002, the upper house of the German 
parliament passed an immigration law to increase the number of skilled workers in 
Germany.238 However, due to a voting disparity, the "center-right Christian Democratic 
Union … denounced the outcome as unconstitutional and vowed to appeal to Germany's 
high court" thereby showing its resolve and power to influence the issue.239 
 German Government research institutes as well as international security 
organizations publish analyzes of policy and guidance regarding crime and immigration 
that could be used to enhance German security measures related to immigration and 
crime. The Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Berlin published an article as recently as 
August 2007 that stressed the need for the EU to set out a clear immigrant integration 
agenda.240  The Interpol website contains summary information on Germany's judicial 
and police force capabilities that can be shared with other law enforcement officials in the 
EU for a unified and cooperative effort to address immigrant-related crime in Europe.241 
News reporting in 2007 remarked that Europol had requested an increase in its powers for 
prosecution of new threats (currently limited to organized crime).242 "The German 
authorities … requested the assistance of Europol in supporting their national measures 
taken to ensure the security of the FIFA World Cup in Germany starting on 9 June 
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(2006)."243 There is a historical precedent for Germany to request assistance from 
Europol regarding security matters internal to their borders.  
D.  INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
 The need for improved cooperation between European law enforcement agencies 
has been prominent in recent public debates since the trial of French serial killer Michel 
Fourniret.244 The German Justice Minister, Brigitte Zypries, has stressed the importance 
of improved networking of existing national crime registers in an updated electronic 
system to replace the paper-based system instead of creating another EU-wide crime 
database.245  
Germany is currently working together with France and Spain on a 
computer-based system for exchanging crime register data….. (to) make it 
possible to submit information requests on-line to police authorities in the 
respective other countries and for the latter to respond quickly and 
without need for bureaucratic procedures.246  
Recently, Europe's joint crime-fighting instruments, which include "European arrest 
warrant, mutual assistance in providing evidence, as well as mutual recognition and 
enforcement of court judgments," have improved the overall security system in 
Europe.247 
 European heads of state have reached a consensus regarding the need for 
"developing a common EU policy on asylum and migration and combining this with the 
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fight against international terrorism."248 This policy, under the Hague Programme, will 
seek to develop a "common EU authority for asylum matters by the year 2010" and to 
"expand judicial cooperation."249 Unfortunately, an "agreement on the creation of a 
European office of public prosecutions" has yet to be reached.250 "Under (the Hague 
Program) member states are to cooperate more closely in fighting terrorism and to 
implement the principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions in criminal 
matters."251 
E.  EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS TO ADDRESS CRIME AND 
IMMIGRATION ISSUES 
 Today, there exist several institutions around the world that address transnational 
crime and are well suited to change in scope to become a forum to address immigration 
issues as well. The ability of an institution to transform its mission long after its inception 
is encapsulated in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
1. NATO 
The Washington Treaty, signed on 4 April 1949, constructed the foundation of 
NATO's requirement for political consultation, manifested by rhetoric and through 
burden-sharing and burden-shifting. The Treaty's adaptability and flexibility has ensured 
the success of NATO for decades. Articles II, III, IV and IX directly required the 
members of NATO to create the institutions and protocols in a manner that allowed their 
roles and discussion to transform with the ever-changing challenges of the international 
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community. The deliberate stepping stone approach of increasing the number of members 
and the functional scope of NATO has effectively maintained security in Europe since 
1949. The flexibility of NATO’s membership, military involvement and constant political 
consultation as promulgated by the Articles continues to ensure NATO’s success.   The 
“explanation of NATO’s impressive longevity… is based (on)…how and why NATO's 
declarations kept changing …shed(s) some light on what held the alliance together- how 
its political response system worked, and perhaps how it may be expected to work in the 
future.”
252 “It was important to build on the existing foundation in institutions in Europe 
of which NATO was an essential one. The Alliance has already changed substantially 
since the end of the Cold War. The concept of containment no longer governed NATO’s 
strategy and planning. Instead, the Alliance was focusing on new threats that could arise 




 NATO's ability to slowly expand its membership to maintain its power while 
increasing its influence and its activities outside of its original boarders has increased the 
security of Europe and the World. The Maturity of the Alliance provides a cornerstone to 
the success of international cooperation throughout the world in which the mission truly 
defines the coalition. NATO solved the empirical puzzle by expanding and redefining its 
mission it did not fall apart. NATO provides the mold by which other international 
organizations should caste their model of an organization's flexibility. 
2. The United Nations (UN) 
 In the worldwide organization's opening pages of its founding document, the 
Charter of the United Nations, signed in San Francisco in June of 1945, bears the key to 
the inability of the UN to address transnational crime stemming from illegal immigration. 
The people of the United Nations pledged they were determined to "promote social 
progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, and for these ends to practice 
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tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and to unite our 
strength to maintain international peace and security."254 The UN focuses on peaceful 
migration not the enforcement of crime associated with illegal migration. Chapter I of the 
UN Charter specifically outlines the purposes of the UN which includes "to maintain 
international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for 
the prevention and removal of threats to peace…. To achieve international co-operation 
in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian 
character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights…. (and) to be a 
centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends." 
255 The Charter enables the UN to become an umbrella for international cooperation 
regarding illegal immigration issues; however the institution does not focus on 
enforcement as much as resolution. Article 52 of the charter further exemplifies that 
"regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the 
maintenance of international peace and security" are in the intent of the UN as long they 
are consistent with the "purposes and principles" of the UN.256 Chapter IX of the charter 
addresses international economic and social cooperation and states the "UN shall promote 
solutions of international economic, social, health and relation problems; and 
international cultural and educational co-operation."257 Article 62 establishes the 
"Economic and Social Council may make or initiate studies and reports with respect to 
international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters and make 
recommendations with respect to any such matters to the General Assembly, to the 
Members of the United Nations, and to the specialized agencies concerned."258 
 The UN addresses international crime with rhetoric and plans but with little 
action. "The international community, preoccupied as it was with East-West competition 
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and with regional conflicts, has been slow to come to terms with the new challenge posed 
by transnational criminal organizations. One major initiative in bringing the threat to 
public attention, however, was the World Ministerial Conference on transnational 
organized crime held in Naples from 21 to 23 November 1994"259 at which 
representatives assembled. A Political Declaration and Action Plan "designed to initiate 
more effective measures to prevent and control cross-border criminal activities" were the 
fruits of the meeting.
260
 These papers contained a "series of recommendations that can be 
initiated in response at the national, regional and global levels" which highlighted the 
"reasons why organized crime has taken on a transnational character as well as the kinds of 
challenges it poses to national and international security".
261
 The papers also highlighted the 
need to incorporate national activities that both prevent and control international crime and 
"the need for inter-state cooperation against transnational organized crime, but also identifies 
the impediments to cooperation, many of which come down to concerns over sovereignty."
262
  
The UN report stresses the importance of regional cooperation as transnational crime takes 
"different forms in different regions…. There have already been some very positive regional 
initiatives, which have extended the bounds of cooperation beyond purely bilateral. These 
include the Council of Europe's Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation 
of the Proceeds from Crime."
263
 "Bilateral, regional and multilateral forms of cooperation all 
have certain advantages and … they should be regarded as complementary."
264
 Decisive 
action taken against transnational organized crime in many countries and the "attention 
devoted to it by the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice and the 
legislative bodies of the United Nations, in particular the General Assembly and the 
Economic and Social Council, demonstrate that the issue is a major priority for member 
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 The UN continues to offer an opportunity for the sharing of ideas regarding 
transnational crime, but remains ill suited for regional actions required in Europe to address 
the need for coordinated immigration policies. 
 December 12-15, 2000, 124 countries signed the UN Convention Against 
Transnational and Organized Crime, only 81 member countries signed the protocol 
against trafficking persons and only 78 member countries signed the protocol against 
smuggling migrants.
266
 Unfortunately, the UN's Millennium Development Goals fails to 
include addressing transnational crime and immigration issues.
267
 And the current UN 
Security Council efforts center on important localized conflicts throughout the world and 
not the question of transnational crime and illegal immigration.268  The solution to the 
immigration issues in Europe requires action, not declarations, therefore the UN remains 
ill suited to offer a solution, but regional focused institutions in Europe offer that 
opportunity. 
3. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe  
 "With 56 participating States from Europe, Central Asia and North America, the 
(OSCE) forms the largest regional security organization in the world. The OSCE is a 
primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-
conflict rehabilitation in its area. It has 19 missions or field operations in South-Eastern 
Europe, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. The Organization deals with 
three dimensions of security - the politico-military, the economic and environmental, and 
the human dimension. It therefore addresses a wide range of security-related concerns, 
including arms control, confidence- and security-building measures, human rights, 
national minorities, democratization, policing strategies, counter-terrorism and economic 
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and environmental activities. All 56 participating States enjoy equal status, and decisions 
are taken by consensus on a politically, but not legally binding basis."269 
 "The OSCE traces its origins to the détente phase of the early 1970s, when the 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) was created to serve as a 
multilateral forum for dialogue and negotiation between East and West. Meeting over 
two years in Helsinki and Geneva, the CSCE reached agreement on the Helsinki Final 
Act, which was signed on 1 August 1975. This document contained a number of key 
commitments on politico-military, economic, environmental and human rights issues that 
became central to the so-called 'Helsinki process'. It also established ten fundamental 
principles (the 'Decalogue') governing the behavior of States towards their citizens, as 
well as towards each other. Until 1990, the CSCE functioned mainly as a series of 
meetings and conferences that built on and extended the participating States' 
commitments, while periodically reviewing their implementation. However, with the end 
of the Cold War, the Paris Summit of November 1990 set the CSCE on a new course. In 
the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, the CSCE was called upon to play its part in 
managing the historic change taking place in Europe and responding to the new 
challenges of the post-Cold War period, which led to its acquiring permanent institutions 
and operational capabilities. As part of this institutionalization process, the name was 
changed from the CSCE to the OSCE by a decision of the Budapest Summit of Heads of 
State or Government in December 1994." 270 Like NATO, through this process OSCE 
demonstrated its ability to transform to the needs of the regional community it supported. 
Of note Spain, Germany and France were admitted to the CSCE on 25 June 1973.271 The 
backbone of the OSCE could provide a strong and appropriate foundation for 
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a. Interpol  
Interpol, the world’s largest international police organization, was created 
in 1923, and "it facilitates cross-border police co-operation, and supports and assists all 
organizations, authorities and services whose mission is to prevent or combat 
international crime" among its 186 member countries.272  "Interpol aims to facilitate 
international police co-operation even where diplomatic relations do not exist between 
particular countries."273 In theory, Interpol's global police communications system should 
provide police with a common platform to "share crucial information about criminals and 
criminality", but it is only as beneficial if it is used.274 The organization's databases and 
services "ensure that police worldwide have access to the information and services they 
need to prevent and investigate crimes. Databases include data on criminals such as 
names, fingerprints and DNA profiles, and stolen property such as passports, vehicles and 
works of art."275 "Interpol supports law enforcement officials in the field with emergency 
support and operational activities, especially in its priority crime areas of fugitives, public 
safety and terrorism, drugs and organized crime, trafficking in human beings and 
financial and high-tech crime. A Command and Co-ordination Centre operates 24 hours a 
day, seven days a week."276 "Interpol provides focused police training initiatives for 
national police forces, and also offers on-demand advice, guidance and support in 
building dedicated crime-fighting components. The aim is to enhance the capacity of 
member countries to effectively combat serious trans-national crime and terrorism."277 
The "sharing (of) knowledge, skills and best practices in policing through Interpol 
channels and the establishment of global standards on how to combat specific forms of 
crimes" is a great first step toward cooperation and coordination.278 Although Interpol 
provides a secure system that allows the national centers to exchange information and 
                                                 








focuses on training, there is still room for improvement. In order to destroy the 
international organized crime groups, coordination of international and domestic 
investigations is required; Interpol could eventually transform into an effective conduit to 
achieving this goal.279 
b. Europol 
"Europol is the European Union law enforcement organization that 
handles criminal intelligence. Its aim is to improve the effectiveness and cooperation 
between the competent authorities of the Member States in preventing and combating 
serious international organised crime and terrorism. The mission of Europol is to make a 
significant contribution to the European Union’s law enforcement action against 
organised crime and terrorism, with an emphasis on targeting criminal organizations."280 
This vague mission statement has enabled Europol to change with the needs of the 
region. "The establishment of Europol was agreed in the Maastricht Treaty281 on 
European Union of 7 February 1992. Based in The Hague, Netherlands, Europol started 
limited operations on 3 January 1994 in the form of the Europol Drugs Unit (EDU) 
fighting against drugs. Progressively, other important areas of criminality were added. As 
of 1 January 2002, the mandate of Europol was extended to deal with all serious forms of 
international crime as listed in the annex to the Europol Convention. The Europol 
Convention was ratified by all Member States and came into force on 1 October 1998. 
Following a number of legal acts related to the Convention, Europol commenced its full 
activities on 1 July 1999." 282  
"Europol supports the law enforcement activities of the Member States 
mainly against: illicit drug trafficking, illicit immigration networks, terrorism, forgery of 
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money (counterfeiting of the Euro) and other means of payment, trafficking in human 
beings (including child pornography), illicit vehicle trafficking, and money laundering. In 
addition, other main priorities for Europol include crimes against persons, financial crime 
and cybercrime. This applies where an organised criminal structure is involved and two 
or more Member States are affected."283 Europol's transformation of missions could be 
further increased to address illegal immigration issues directly. 
"Europol supports (crime reduction) by facilitating the exchange of 
information, in accordance with national law, between Europol liaison officers (ELOs); 
ELOs are seconded to Europol by the Member States as representatives of their national 
law enforcement agencies; providing operational analysis in support of operations; 
generating strategic reports (e.g., threat assessments) and crime analysis on the basis of 
information and intelligence supplied by Member States and third parties; and providing 
expertise and technical support for investigations and operations carried out within the 
EU, under the supervision and the legal responsibility of the Member States concerned. 
Europol is also active in promoting crime analysis and harmonization of investigative 
techniques within the Member States."284 "The Europol Convention states that Europol 
shall establish and maintain a computerized system to allow the input, access and analysis 
of data. The Convention lays down a strict framework for… data protection, control, 
supervision and security. The Europol computer system (TECS) has three principal 
components: an information system, an analysis system, and an index system. Europol is 
funded by contributions from the Member States according to their GNP." 285  The 2007 
budget is 70.5 million Euros. 286 Europol's infrastructure and mission statements is very 
well suited to address crime and issues related to illegal immigration on a regional level. 
                                                 
283Europol Website. http://www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=facts. Accessed 18 September 
2007. 
284 Europol Website. http://www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=facts. Accessed 18 September 
2007. 
285 Interpol Website. http://www.Interpol.int/public/icpo/default.asp. Accessed 18 September 2007. 
286 Ibid. 
 78
F.  GERMAN USE OF INTERNATIONAL EUROPEAN ORGANIZATIONS 
TO INCREASE SECURITY AND DECREASE IMMIGRANT RELATED 
CRIME 
1. German Involvement in the EU 
 Since the late 1940s, Germany's desire to establish its position in the world has 
affected both its foreign and security policies.287 Those policies exemplify Germany's 
"firm commitment to co-operation within multilateral institutions and by a rejection of 
the use of military force as a tool of foreign policy."288 Since the reunification of 
Germany on 3 October 1990, German foreign policy has changed substantially; 
"politicians have pushed the armed forces to take on more responsibility in securing 
international stability, and German military personnel are now found in all corners of the 
world, alongside those of the country's multilateral partners."289 Germany, due in part to 
its lack of a UN Security Council permanent seat, relies on its influence on other states 
within multinational institutions to ensure that its desires are realized in world politics.290  
Current U.S. unilateral actions and the "mission defines the coalition" rhetoric do not 
benefit Germany.291  Germany continues to forge "multilateral agreement through its 
involvement in small-group co-operation with leading states, such as in the NATO Quad 
(USA, UK, France, Germany) or in the so-called directoire (leading group) of the CDSP 
with France and the UK."292 German economic and political might resounds at the center 
of the EU.293 Germany continues to fill international leadership roles; Germany "held the 
Presidency of the Council of the European Union in the first half of 2007."294  
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Under German leadership the EU Reform Treaty was addressed, and this treaty "is 
intended to lay new foundations for making the EU ready for the challenges of the 21st 
century. The common goal is to make the European Union more democratic, transparent 
and efficient."295 The EU with its open internal borders is addressing immigrant-related 
crime through its agencies and institutions. Germany has taken a leadership role in many 
of these arenas. 
a. German Interaction with European Police College (CEPOL) 
The EU established CEPOL as an EU agency in 2005 "to bring together 
senior police officers from police forces in Europe - essentially to support the 
development of a network - and encourage cross-border cooperation in the fight against 
crime, public security and law and order by organizing training activities and research 
findings."
296
 The German Police University hosted the 2007 CEPOL European Police 
Research and Science Conference, which "focused on issues regarding a European 
approach to police science and was dedicated to discuss the report tabled by the 
respective CEPOL Project Group." 297 To address the need of EU member states to train 
their police academically and scientifically, "CEPOL established a temporary project 
group in 2005, called 'European Approach to Police Science'."298 On 19 October 2007, 
the strategic cooperation agreement between CEPOL and Europol was signed  
to enhance the cooperation between Europol and CEPOL in strengthening 
the training of senior police officers, in particular by organizing courses, 
seminars and conferences and developing and implementing common 
curricula and course material… The agreement will also allow for the 
exchange of information between CEPOL and Europol and access to the 
European Police Research and Science Database (eDoc) at CEPOL. This 
agreement will further strengthen the collaboration between Europol and 
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CEPOL in the training of senior police officers in Europe to encourage 
the cross-border cooperation in the fight against crime, public security 
and law and order.299 
During the first half of 2007, Germany held the Presidency of CEPOL.  
The existing CEPOL curriculum is being improved to include Management of Diversity 
and other very difficult international police issues.300 "The Common Curriculum on 
Police Cooperation and Europol aims to support CEPOL partners to establish and 
develop national and international training about Europol and its role in the international 
law enforcement cooperation."301 Germany and other countries will continue to capitalize 
on the power of CEPOL to educate law enforcement personnel; this education can assist 
police professionals to reduce the incidence and the severity of immigrant-related crime. 
b. German Interaction with EUROJUST 
In 2002, the EU created EUROJUST "to enhance the effectiveness of the 
competent authorities within Member States when they are dealing with the investigation 
and prosecution of serious cross-border and organised crime."302  
EUROJUST stimulates and improves the co-ordination of investigations 
and prosecutions between competent authorities in the Member States…. 
by facilitating the execution of international mutual legal assistance and 
the implementation of extradition requests" which allows "investigations 
and prosecutions (to be) more effective when dealing with cross border 
crime...EUROJUST is the first permanent network of judicial authorities 
to be established anywhere in the world. EUROJUST hosts meetings, with 
translation facilities, between investigators and prosecutors from different 
states dealing with individual cases and at a strategic level and specific 
types of criminality. EUROJUST fulfils a unique role as a new permanent 
body in the European legal area. Its mission is to enhance the 
development of  
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Europe-wide co-operation on criminal justice cases... The national 
members are senior, experienced prosecutors or judges; some national 
members are supported by Deputies and Assistants.303 
Since its inception, Germany has been and continues to remain involved in 
EUROJUST. Germany participated in a February 2003 EUROJUST coordination 
meeting in Finland.304 However, some German laws complicate implementation of 
decisions made by EUROJUST.305 In 2002-2003, Germany was the country with the 
second highest number of requests submitted to EUROJUST.306 Germany continues to 
support and utilize EUROJUST in its efforts to address transnational crime of different 
sorts. The increased coordination across borders reduces the possibility of immigrant 
criminals to flee from one area of jurisdiction to another and therefore reduces the 
likelihood of heinous immigrant-caused crime.  
c. German Interaction with Europol  
Although EUROPOL was established in 1992, it did not begin to fulfill all 
its requirements until 1999.307 Coordinated action through EUROPOL can address crime 
and has been achieved quite recently. EUROPOL is well suited to address and reduce 
immigrant related crime. 
Germany supports EUROPOL through its personnel. In 2007, just under 
sixty employees of EUROPOL were German Nationals.308 The graph below shows that 
this is quite supportive as compared to most other nations. 
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Figure 12.   EUROPOL Staff by Nationality.309 
 
Currently, Germany also holds a noteworthy leadership role at 
EUROPOL. "The Directorate of Europol is appointed by the Council of the European 
Union (Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs). It currently consists of Director Max-
Peter Ratzel (Germany) and the Deputy Directors Mariano Simancas (Spain), Michel 
Quillé (France) and Kevin O’Connell (United Kingdom)."310  
German cooperation with EUROPOL has resulted in great dividends in 
fighting crime. In January 2006, a EUROPOL-supported German and Dutch investigation 
resulted in raids of four production and storage locations of illegal synthetic drugs, the 
arrest of 21 people, and the end of a "major criminal group."311 As previously noted, 
Germany requested EUROPOL support of German security for the FIFA World Cup 
2006 that was hosted by Germany; the football312 tournament was a security success 
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thanks to the cooperation with EUROPOL.313  German surveillance teams coordinated 
through the EUROPOL liaison bureau to assist in the arrest of persons transporting 
explosives from Denmark to Switzerland in a vehicle.314 In this author's opinion, it is just 
a matter of time until this documented cooperation includes an incident of violent crime 
committed by immigrants crossing borders or involving illegal actions in multiple 
nations. German contributions to EUROPOL efforts do not stop at the action level but 
reach into helping EUROPOL become a better organization to enable action. 
German efforts have also improved EUROPOL's infrastructure. As 
previously noted, Germany has also assisted in the enhancement of EUROPOL 
Information Systems, and "in 2006 the German and Dutch data loaders began operation 
and Spain and Denmark started development and testing of their data loaders… 
EUROPOL plans to add a number of enhancements to the information system, including 
an audit tool as well as upgrades requested by users."315 Germany shares cases from its 
"national data network into the Europol information system." 316 Germany's shared 
information with other nations through EUROPOL strives to reduce international drug 
trafficking, organized crime, and international terrorism.317 The sheer volume of 
information that Germany is sharing is nothing short of impressive. This year it is 
projected that the "overall number of transactions will exceed 12,000."318 
G.  SUMMARY OF GERMAN INTERNATIONAL COORDINATON 
EFFORTS 
 Germany's coordination with other European nations and European security 
institutions remains on par with the security threat that immigrant-related crime has posed 
in recent years. The presence of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that are also 
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supported by the German Government unequivocally shows German resolve to not only 
address the issues at hand, but also protect the individual citizens of Germany (illegal or 
not) who are affected by immigrant-related crime. The research findings contained in this 
thesis show that all elements of German society acknowledge the problem and that 
German security institutions, and political parties in coordination with concerned citizens, 
are looking both within and beyond the country's borders for resolution of the issues at 
hand.  In conclusion, continued international coordination in attempts to decrease 
immigrant-related crime can be expected in the future. The impact of Germany's 
leadership role within European security institutions is recognized in the European 
community and the international press. It can be expected under the leadership of Angela 
Merkel the trend of German efforts to enhance security will continue in the foreseeable 
future. 
H.  PAST MOVEMENT TOWARDS COOPERATION ON IMMIGRATION 
 After the Treaty of Rome in 1957, and a series of bilateral agreements in Europe, 
the Schengen agreement in 1985 was the next milestone regarding migration in Europe, 
however many view the Schengen Agreement "skeptically in many quarters. The soft 
spots in the external frontiers mean that abandoned frontier checks will require 
compensatory mechanisms and intelligence sources to enable police to cope with the 
anticipated increase in transnational organized crime making use of safe havens in the 
vulnerable pockets of immigrant ghettos."319 "The Schengen Agreement envisaged the 
removal of intra-EC borders in exchange for strengthening the region's external 
borders."320 "After the signing of the Schengen Agreement, the Ministers Responsible for 
Immigration created the Ad Hoc Immigration Group of Senior Officials (AHIG) as the 
organizational vehicle for pursuing cooperation on immigration policies. During the next 
two years the AHIG attempted to devise measures and principles on visa policy, external 
borders, and common rules to determine the member state responsible for examining an 
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asylum application. Emphasizing the connections between border controls and 
immigration, the AHIG insisted that each member state consider measures necessary to 
compensate for potential security risks to the other members should its own external 
border policies fail."321 Unfortunately, to this day the region's external borders of the EU 
remain somewhat permeable to transnational criminals and illegal immigrants. 
 Another "principal catalyst for increased intergovernmental cooperation on 
immigration policies among EC member states was the February 1986 signing of the 
Single European Act (SEA), which entered into force on July 1, 1987. The Act marked 
the first major reform of the EEC's "constitutional" framework since the 1957 Rome 
Treaty… To abolish frontiers between EC countries would in turn convince member 
states of the need to cooperate on admission and other border control measures, thus 
creating a context for subsequent efforts to bring immigration policy into the institutional 
framework of the EC. Although the Act did not include mention of common immigration 
policies, Article 8a of the SEA set policy goals that, realistically could not (and cannot) 
be fully realized without EC-wide policies on immigration."322 Article 8a created an 
"area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services 
and capital is ensured" and resulted in immediate conflict regarding the Article's 
interpretation.323 "Although the Act did not create a common immigration policy, the 
implications of its priority objectives- particularly in the security realm- generated 
sufficient cause for subsequent attempts to bring immigration matters into the ambit of 
Community competence." 324  
I.  CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 Coordination of immigration policies is necessary for success in Europe due to the 
porous boarders. Scholars agree that "the best evolution in this regard would be for the 
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EC processes and institutions to become the primary European setting for immigration 
policy development and implementation. This would place immigration squarely into the 
framework where overarching issues of regional concern are handled. It would also 
overcome the deficiencies of the intergovernmental process… In this connection, the 
Maastricht right of co-initiative should be fully utilized".325 The EU and Europol offer 
the infrastructure of well established institutions that are capable of addressing 
immigration policy cooperation.  "Establishing immigration systems and policies in 
Europe should be the path to effective facilitation and regulation of migration flows that 
are inevitable and to incorporating immigration effectively into a nation's economic and 
social goals. Nevertheless, Fortress Europe could also be the outcome if policy 
implementation is not generous and is driven by xenophobia."326 Effective and united 
cooperation addressing regional immigration issues could avoid future conflict and 
enhance the benefits of legal immigration and working in the regions. "Should the idea of 
a quota system take hold, levels of annual immigrant admissions could be proposed by 
the EC Commission, after consultation with the European Parliament, to the EC Council 
of Ministers. Or, the EC could establish a new position of High Commissioner for 
Immigration, with duties that would include making recommendations for meetings the 
EC's immigration needs.  A Migration Convention might also allow for a non-EC 
national legally residing in a member state to work in another EC country, thereby 
increasing the labor pool within the EC able to respond to the region's labor demands," 
but this may result in more rhetoric than less action.327 The (European) immigration 
problem "requires harmonization of legal systems (to provide a)… substitute for the lack 
of a 'hard' external frontier. Immigration, drugs and crime cannot be tackled in sequence 
but must all be addressed at the same time; (which)… demands international co- 
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operation, information exchange and at least bilateral cross-frontier arrangements.... Only 
a strong efficient EC can produce the surplus to aid the rest of Europe and meet its global 
responsibilities." 328 
 "A comprehensive, multi-layered approach to international cooperation in 
criminal justice and law enforcement in the fight against transnational organized crime" 
is needed to address the illegal immigration problem in Europe.329 "Ideally, a truly 
effective international approach would be composed of a web of bilateral, regional and 
multilateral agreements complementing and promoting one another….Bilateral and 
multilateral forms of cooperation are complementary rather than mutually exclusive, but 
whether international cooperation can evolve in ways that allow a response to 
transnational criminal organizations commensurate with the threat depends on the 
capacity of states to understand that criminal justice and law enforcement systems can no 
longer be viewed as purely national concerns."330 Immigration is a regional issue that 
requires a regional forum to ensure cooperation and desired effect. Immigration policies 
within a region are only as strong as the weakest link. 
 "Multiculturalism, which is so constantly and passionately promoted, can 
sometimes amount to an abandonment and denial, a flight from one's own heritage. 
However, multiculturalism cannot survive without common foundations, without a sense 
of direction offered by our own values." 331 "Integration, this wonderful concept so 
beloved by the liberal West, is really a form of imposition. And what about dialogue, 
tolerance, respect, and reciprocal offers to meet and learn from each other?" 332 
The age of migration could be marked by the erosion of nationalism and 
the weakening of divisions between peoples. Admittedly there are 
countervailing tendencies, such as racism, the 'fortress Europe' mentality, 
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or the resurgence of nationalism in certain areas... But the inescapable 
central trends are the increasing ethnic and cultural diversity of most 
countries, the emergence of transnational networks which link the 
societies of emigration and immigration countries and the growth of 
cultural interchange.333 
"For a person to be integrated into society, one must first be clear and firm about what he 
or she is being integrated into. Integration cannot be accomplished by just saying that our 
house is so hospitable, so big, so divested of its own symbols (starting with the crucifix), 
with room enough for the visitor or anyone else to do whatever they may want. Such an 
attitude, as you say, amounts to 'a flight from one's own things'. Integration is different, 
profoundly different from aggregation. Integration presumes that there is a dialogue that 
takes the host's position as a starting point. The only thing that aggregation presumes that 
there is a dialogue that takes the host's position as a starting point. The only thing that 
aggregation presumes is indulgence. Integration does not mean having equal departure 
points. It means sharing an equal willingness to accept the common arrival point." 334 
Because of European citizens' rights and prosperity, Europe will continue to draw 
immigrants for the foreseeable future.335  
 
                                                 
333Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller. The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in 
the Modern World. New York. The Guilford Press. 1998, 298. 
334 Joseph Ratzinger and Marcello Pera. Without Roots The West, Relativism, Christianity, Islam. New 
York. Basic Books. 2006, 90. 
335 Ibid., 89. 
 89
APPENDIX 
A SELECTION OF ANTI-JEWISH LAWS, DECREES AND 
ORDINANCES IN THE THIRD REICH336 
 
 




7 April 1933 Law for the Restoration 
of the Professional Civil 
Service 
Excludes “non-Aryan” civil 
servants (exceptions for 
“privileged non-Aryans”) 
Excludes of “non-Aryan” 
teachers (exceptions for 
“privileged non-Aryans”) 
7 April Law Regarding 
Admission to the Legal 
Profession 
Excludes “non-Aryan” lawyers 
(with exceptions) 
 
22 April Decree Regarding 
Physicians’ Services 
with the National Health 
Insurance 
Excludes “non-Aryan” doctors 
from panel practice (with 
exceptions) 
 
25 April Law Against the 
Overcrowding of 
German Schools 










Annulment of German 
Citizenship 
Decree to same law 
Basis for the revocation of 
naturalization of eastern European 
Jews 
 
22 September Law Regarding the 
Establishment of a 
Reich Chamber of 
Culture 
Basis for excluding “non-Aryans” 
from art, music, literature, etc. 
 
29 September Law Regarding Peasant 
Holdings 
Excludes “non-Aryans from farm 
labor and ownership of land 
 
4 October Law Regarding Editors Excludes “non-Aryans” from 
journalism and the media 
 
23 March 1934 Law Regarding 
Expulsion from the 
Reich 
Basis for deportation of eastern 
European Jews 
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Date Title of Law, Decree or 
Ordinance 
Purpose 
21 May 1935 Defense Law Excludes “non-Aryans” from 
military service 
 
26 June Reich Labor Service 
Law 
Excludes “non-Aryans” from the 
Labor Service 
 
15 September Reich Law on 
Citizenship 
Changes Jews’ legal status from 
citizen to subject 
 
15 September Law for the Protection 
of German Blood and 
Honor 
Criminalizes intermarriage  
14 November First Decree 
Supplementing Reich 
Law on Citizenship 
Compulsory retirement of all 
Jewish officials 
Introduces and explains racial 
categories 
28 March 1938 Law on the Legal Status 
of Jewish Communities 
Deprives Jewish communities of 
status as “bodies of public law” 
 
22 April Decree against Aiding 
Concealment of 
Ownership of Jewish 
Enterprises 
Prohibits non-Jews from 
concealing Jewish business 
ownership 
 
26 April Decree Regarding 
Registration of Jewish 
Property 
Enforces registration of Jewish 
domestic and foreign property 
over 5,000 RM 
 
6 July Law on Industrial 
Enterprises 
Excludes Jews from industry  
23 July Third Notice Regarding 
Identification Cards 
Special ID cards for Jews  
25 July Fourth Decree 
Supplementing Reich 
Law on Citizenship 
Cancels licenses for Jewish 
doctors, with exceptions for care 
of Jewish patients 
 
17 August Second Decree 
Supplementing Law 
Regarding Change of 
Names 
Compulsory “Jewish” first names  
27 September Fifth Decree 
Supplementing Reich 
Law on Citizenship 
Revokes bar admission for Jews, 
with exceptions for representing 
Jewish clients 
 
12 November Decree Regarding the 
“Atonement Fine” for 
Jews 
Imposes a fine of 1 billion RM on 
all German Jews 
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Date Title of Law, Decree or 
Ordinance 
Purpose 
12 November Decree Regarding the 
Elimination of Jews 
from German Economic 
Life 
Removes all remaining Jews from 
German economy 
 
12 November Decree Regarding 
Restoration of Jewish 
Place of Business 
Orders Jews to restore at their own 
cost all damages caused by 
“Crystal Night” pogrom 
 
15 November Ordinance Regarding 
School Attendance of 
Jewish Children 
Excludes all Jewish children from 
German schools 
 
28 November Police Decree 
Regarding the 
Appearance of Jews in 
Public 
Bans Jews from certain districts; 
restricted hours when Jews could 
appear in public (shopping, etc.) 
 
3 December Decree Regarding 
Utilization of Jewish 
Property 
Compulsory sale and restricted 






Registration of Jewish 
Property 
Confiscates gold and valuables 
owned by Jews 
 
4 March Decree Regarding the 
Employment of Jews 
Introduces forced labor for Jews  
30 April Law Regarding Leases 
with Jews 
Basis for exclusion of Jews from 
non-Jewish dwellings and 
establishment of Jewish districts 
 
4 July Tenth Decree 
Supplementing Reich 
Law on Citizenship 
Establishes Reich Association of 
Jews in Germany as sole 
representative of all Jewish affairs 
 
2 February 1940 Decree Regarding the 
Emigration Tax for Jews 
Establishes special emigration tax 
for Jews 
 
6 February Decree Regarding 
Clothing Rationing for 
Jews 
Withholds ration cards for 






Badges for Jews 
Compels all Jews over the age of 
six to wear Star of David badge 
 
31 October Decree Regarding the 
Employment of Jews 
Fixes stringent regulations on the 
employment of Jews 
 
25 November Eleventh Decree 
Supplementing the 
Reich Law on 
Citizenship 
Deprives Jews residing abroad of 
their status as German subjects 
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Date Title of Law, Decree or 
Ordinance 
Purpose 
17 April 1942 Ordinance Regarding 
Identification of Jewish 
Apartments 
Requires marking of Jewish 
dwellings with Star of David 
 
17 April Decree Regarding Use 
of Public Conveyances 
Prohibits use of public transit to 
Jews 
 
15 May “Nuisance” decree Prohibits Jews from keeping pets  
29 May “Nuisance” decree Prohibits Jews from using the 
services of non-Jewish 
hairdressers 
 
19 June Decree Confiscates electric appliances, 
typewriters and bicycles owned by 
Jews 
 
9 October “Nuisance” decree Prohibits Jews from buying books  
1 July 1943 Thirteenth Decree 
Supplementing the 
Reich Law on 
Citizenship 
Denies Jews protection of courts 
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